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In the ongoing discussions about financial services regulation, one
critically important topic has not been recognized, let alone addressed.
That topic is what this Article calls the “entity-centrism” of financial
services regulation. Laws and rules are entity-centric when they assume
that a financial services firm is a stand-alone entity, operating separately from and independently of any other entity. They are entitycentric, therefore, when the specific requirements and obligations they
comprise are addressed only to an abstract and solitary “firm,” with little
or no contemplation of affiliates, parent companies, subsidiaries, or
multi-entity enterprises. Regulatory entity-centrism is not an isolated
phenomenon, as it permeates the laws and rules governing many facets
of a firm’s operations. Moreover, it can be discerned in laws and rules
covering many types of financial services activities. In other words,
entity-centrism in financial services regulation is pervasive. It is also
deeply problematic.
This Article calls attention to entity-centrism as manifested in
financial services regulation, shows why entity-centrism counters regulatory objectives, and assesses possible explanations for the phenomenon. It
does so primarily by evaluating two recent regulatory failures that reveal
how entity-focused laws and rules privilege entity boundaries over the
various ways in which multiple entities (or entities and individuals)
work together as a common enterprise. Accordingly, the Article contends
that financial services regulation should look past entity boundaries and
that lawmakers and regulators should think more broadly, critically,
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and creatively to address the persistent and significant regulatory difficulties that entity-centrism has spawned.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial services regulation is complex. Among other difficulties,
lawmakers and regulators do not always understand what, exactly, has to
be regulated—what market failure or inefficiency, in other words, gave
rise to the need for regulation. The complicated financial products that
fueled, if not precipitated, the 2008 financial crisis are poster children
for this point.1 In addition, regardless of whether the “what” is understood adequately, the “how” often presents intractable difficulties, for it
1. See, e.g., Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, U.S. Senate Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a
Financial Collapse 1 (2011), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/reportpsi-staff-report-wall-street-and-the-financial-crisis-anatomy-of-a-financial-collapse (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting financial crisis was “result of high risk, complex
financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the
credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street”).
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requires achieving a careful balance: How might regulations address the
problems discerned without unduly raising the costs borne by market
participants and stifling productive market activities? Too much or too
little regulation, or the wrong kind, can produce disastrous results.2
Enforcement, lastly, presents its own challenges, limited, as it necessarily
is, by regulators’ resources and investigative skills and focus, not to
mention an often too-close relationship with those subject to regulation,
as the term “revolving door” aptly connotes.3
In the ongoing discussions about regulation and its proper goals,
implementation, and enforcement—encompassing considerations of
how best to protect clients and customers and the circumstances under
which markets function most effectively—one critically important topic
has not been recognized, let alone addressed. That topic is what this
Article calls the “entity-centrism” of financial services regulation—regulation of providers of financial services, such as broker-dealers,4 investment
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407,
411 (1990) (“Sometimes [regulation] has imposed enormously high costs for speculative
benefits; sometimes it has accomplished little or nothing; and sometimes it has aggravated
the very problem it was designed to solve.”).
3. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019,
1043 (2012) (noting SEC staff members, hoping to obtain jobs on Wall Street or with private law firms upon leaving SEC, may “not want to confront the private bar’s elite law
firms”); David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Staff’s “Revolving Door” Prompts Concerns About
Agency’s Independence, Wash. Post (May 13, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2011-05-13/business/35232119_1_sec-employees-sec-inspector-sec-enforcement-actions
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting, according to study by Project on
Government Oversight, “[o]ver the past five years, 219 former SEC employees filed
disclosures with the SEC saying that they planned to represent clients or employers in
dealings with the agency”); Eric Lichtblau, Lawmakers Regulate Banks, Then Flock to
Them, N.Y. Times (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/business/
14lobby.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing finding that in 2009, “at
least 70 former members of Congress were lobbying for Wall Street and the financial
services sector”).
4. A broker-dealer is a natural person or entity that is engaged in the business of buying and selling securities either on behalf of the person’s customers (a broker) or for the
person’s own account (a dealer) and is subject to regulation as such under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012) (defining
“broker”); id. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (defining “dealer”); id. § 78i(j) (prohibiting broker’s or
dealer’s use of mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce “to effect any
transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any” security
unless broker or dealer is registered with SEC as “broker-dealer” under Exchange Act).
Put another way, a broker acts as an agent for its customer and, for each transaction
effected, generally receives a commission as compensation. See Anita K. Krug, The
Modern Corporation Magnified: Managerial Accountability in Financial-Services Holding
Companies, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 821, 833 (2013) (describing role of brokers in securities
transactions). By contrast, a dealer buys and sells securities to customers or others, acting
as a principal in the transaction (and, therefore, bearing the risk associated with the securities in which it transacts), and is compensated through an extra amount added to the
prices of securities sold and paying a discounted price for securities bought. See id.
(describing role of dealers in securities transactions).
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advisers, and mutual funds.5 Laws and rules are entity-centric when they
assume that financial services firms are stand-alone entities, operating
separately from, and independently of, any other entity. They are entitycentric, therefore, when the specific requirements and obligations they
comprise are addressed only to an abstract and solitary unit of business
association, otherwise known as an entity—a single corporation, limited
liability company (LLC), limited partnership, or business trust, for
example—with no contemplation of affiliates, parent companies,
subsidiaries, or multi-entity enterprises.
In many respects, law is built around the entity. It is not difficult
either to appreciate why that is or to conclude that it makes sense. After
all, a substantial portion of the laws and rules that exist today, and doubtless an even larger portion of those to be created in the future, relate to
matters of economics, markets, and productivity. As a result, these laws
and rules concern themselves with such things as incentives, agency costs,
and externalities.6 The primary actors in the marketplace are, of course,
entities—corporations largely, but also limited liability companies,
business trusts, and limited partnerships, to name a few. Entities merge
with other entities. Entities may go bankrupt. Entities invest in other
entities. Entities create and sell goods, or provide services, to their
customers. If the entity is the marketplace actor, then, logically, the entity
should be the regulatory subject.

5. This Article does not address financial services functions that fall within the ambit
of banking regulation and, therefore, does not address the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852
(2012) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), or other laws and rules governing U.S.
banks. Although banking services might seem to be some of the most fundamental of
financial services, this Article’s exclusion of banking regulation reflects the fact that the
objectives of that regulation are largely dissimilar to those of other types of financial
services regulation. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 441, 467–68, 478 (1998) (observing “primary purpose of bank regulation is
the maintenance of the safety and soundness of banking institutions,” which serves “end of
stemming the risk to the bank insurance fund and systemic risk,” whereas “primary
purpose of regulation of securities activities is investor protection”). This Article also does
not discuss regulation of insurance policies and products because insurance regulation
generally remains within the purview of the states and, therefore, reflects disparate
approaches. See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance
Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1707, 1708
(2010) (noting “[f]or the last two centuries, individual states and U.S. territories have
been entrusted with primary responsibility for regulating property, casualty, and life
insurance markets” and “each jurisdiction has its own insurance regulator and set of
insurance laws”).
6. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 44–45 & n.186 (1990) (arguing
existence of agency costs in corporate context does not justify legal rules mandating particular fiduciary standards); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities
Offerings, 1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 7–29 (describing and questioning “regulatory
tenets” that ground U.S. regulation of securities offerings).
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However, entities very often are not self-contained. They frequently
are components of groups of affiliated entities that, together, pursue
related or mutually beneficial activities as a larger enterprise—as an
association of entities, in other words.7 Indeed, this is evident from
society’s collective and concerted focus in recent years on addressing the
systemic implications of “too big to fail” institutions—firms that often
comprise scores of entities but that society regards (and perhaps fears) as
unitary actors. We have no difficulty—and, if anything, it seems only
natural—to disregard the myriad entities that constitute a multinational
enterprise or other conglomerate and, instead, to think of the enterprise
as a unitary being. For example, we tend to refer to Goldman Sachs as an
“it,” even though, as a web of parent companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates, Goldman Sachs could as easily be considered a “they.”8 It may,
therefore, come as a surprise that financial services regulation tends to
take the opposite approach and, in particular, to pay all too much attention to the enterprise’s building blocks—namely, the entities of which it
consists. To use an old idiom, regulation does not see the forest for the
trees.
Regulatory entity-centrism is not an isolated phenomenon in the
financial services realm. It pervades most types of laws and rules, from
those governing a firm’s9 initial registration with the relevant regulatory
body (for example, a brokerage firm’s registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a broker-dealer),10 to the substantive requirements to which the regulated firm must adhere,11 to the
firm’s ultimate insolvency or liquidation.12 In addition, entity-centrism
does not discriminate among financial services activities, as it can be
readily found in laws and rules covering securities broker-dealers, mutual
funds and other registered investment companies, investment advisers,
and futures commission merchants and other intermediaries for commodity futures transactions. Entity-centrism in financial services regulation is pervasive. It is, furthermore, deeply problematic.
7. See, e.g., Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity
Reconceived, 42 Seton Hall L. Rev. 879, 885 (2012) (“Most major public corporations are
in fact part of corporate groups that contain hundreds or even thousands of affiliated
companies around the world.”).
8. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) exh. 21.1 (Mar. 1,
2013), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financial/current/
10k/2012-10-K.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing over eighty “significant
subsidiaries of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. as of December 31, 2012”).
9. This Article uses “firm” to refer to an economic association, whether it consists of
one entity or multiple entities.
10. See infra Part I.A (explaining different types of financial services regulation designate entity as regulatory subject).
11. See infra Part I.B.1–2 (describing ways in which regulation of investment advisers
and mutual funds centers on entity).
12. See infra Part I.B.3 (explaining laws and rules governing bankruptcy are entitycentric).
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This Article’s goal is to show how entity-centrism, as manifested in
financial services regulation, defeats regulatory objectives. To put it
succinctly, entity-centrism counters regulatory goals by privileging entity
boundaries over the various ways in which entities, or entities and
individuals, work together as part of a common enterprise. Entitycentrism insists that the subject and/or beneficiary of regulatory obligations is cohesive and complete in and of itself and thereby ignores how
those whom regulation generally exists to protect—clients and
customers—may be situated outside the entity, leaving their interests
vulnerable, or how actors outside the entity may use the entity to
manipulate or escape regulatory obligations, again leaving the relevant
interests without the protections that the regulations themselves contemplate.
Of course, one might reasonably believe that entity-centrism furthers
important regulatory goals. After all, as suggested above, the corporate
person and other forms of business association are deemed critical to a
thriving capitalist economy. When an investor invests in a business organized as one of these entity forms, the entity structure limits the possible
liability the investor might incur as a result of her partial ownership of
the business to the amount of her investment, thereby encouraging
investment activity and, beyond that, “capital formation.”13 Perhaps, then,
the entity is similarly critical to a thriving financial services regulatory
regime. Even without more, however, that proposition is dubious based
simply on a consideration of the economic role of corporations (and
other entity forms). The corporation’s primary function, stated most
broadly, is to encourage the coming together of business managers, on
the one hand, and suppliers of capital, otherwise known as investors, on
the other.14 From a practical perspective, the corporate form ensures
(albeit with a few exceptions) that investors will not be made responsible
for the corporation’s debts and liabilities.15 From a more theoretical per13. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the
Limits of Limited Liability, 56 Emory L.J. 1305, 1309, 1312 (2007) (noting “limited liability
protects . . . shareholders from personal responsibility for corporate obligations,” which
encourages investment from those who would be reluctant to invest if doing so put their
personal wealth at risk). Capital formation is the process of increasing an economy’s
capital stock (such as buildings, equipment, and other productive goods). Capital
Formation, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital-formation.asp
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). Capital stock, combined
with labor, is a necessary condition for an economy’s production of goods and services and
income growth. See id.
14. Limited liability furthers this purpose by attracting investors to businesses. See D.
Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: Cases, Problems, and Case
Studies 221 (3d ed. 2012) (recounting how, in eighteenth century, limited liability for
investors “was a major factor in the decision to seek incorporation for many businesses”).
15. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990)
(“State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life,
and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets—that enhance
their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the
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spective, the corporate form is a formal, legal embodiment and representation of the most efficient mode of economic production—namely, the
firm.16
Achieving efficiency in productive relationships (such as between
entrepreneurs and capital suppliers) and limiting liability are not primary objectives of financial services regulation, although, to be sure, one
goal of that regulation is to promote efficiency and productivity.17
Financial services regulation, as this Article conceives it, is the regulation
of those—whether entities or individuals—who supply finance- and
investment-related services to third parties. Examples include securities
brokers, futures brokers, and investment advisers. Further, financial
services regulation governs both the ongoing provision of those services
and the process of their cessation, as evidenced by laws and rules covering financial firm liquidations and bankruptcies.18 In financial services
regulation, there is no need to use the entity as the unit of analysis, as
there is nothing about what financial services regulation does—protecting the “users” of financial services and promoting the integrity of the
financial services and capital markets—that cannot extend beyond entity
boundaries.
Indeed, that conclusion is at least implied by instances in which
regulation’s entity focus has given way to superentity doctrines or, at
least, confusion and debate about the regulatory weight to be placed on
the entity. For example, in various contexts, the SEC has embraced an
entity-boundary-be-damned approach to regulatory interpretation and
return on their shareholders’ investments.”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
16. A firm is an aggregation of economic transactions that occur beyond the framework of the market and thus avoid the transaction costs that accompany market relationships. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 391–92 (1937) (explaining how costs associated with obtaining necessary resources through transacting in open
market impel entrepreneurs to form firms, in which they can better control and direct
those resources); see also Charles R.T. O’Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and
Other Business Associations: Cases and Materials 3 (6th ed. 2010) (describing “essence of
the firm” as “entrepreneur’s management and conscious direction of resource allocation
decisions” to perform tasks “that cannot as efficiently be handled via market
transactions”); Matthew T. Bodie, The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law:
Returning to the Theory of the Firm, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1033, 1040–41 (2012) (summarizing Coase’s well-known theory of organization of economic activity in firms). Of course,
because the firm refers to an economic enterprise, rather than a legal form, any particular
firm, in the Coasean sense, might comprise more than one corporation or other legal
entity. See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law
of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4 n.12 (2013) (“An economic
enterprise directed by a single entrepreneur can be split into several legal entities, or
conversely, several disconnected enterprises can be brought under one legal umbrella.”).
17. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 319, 330–32 (2002)
(acknowledging efficiency as one goal of regulation but questioning premise, prevalent in
legal doctrine and scholarship, that it is only goal).
18. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 741–753 (2012) (setting forth rules for liquidation of
broker-dealers).
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enforcement. That approach is the apparent inspiration behind the
SEC’s mantra that, under the securities laws, one is not permitted to do
indirectly what she is not permitted to do directly.19 Rephrased: One
cannot break into multiple steps what one is not permitted to do in one
step; one cannot pursue through multiple entities an activity that one is
not permitted to do using one entity; and so on. In addition, under the
securities laws, a regulated entity’s unlawful actions may also subject the
entity’s parent company or affiliates to liability, such as through the
doctrine of “control person” liability.20
Similarly, in the realm of banking regulation, Supreme Court and
federal court cases from the 1970s and 1980s regarding what activities
banks were permitted to conduct under the now-repealed Glass-Steagall
Act21 often turned on whether banks’ offerings, to customers and others,
of interests in “pooled” investment entities—i.e., investment funds—
created by the banks constituted transactions in “securities.”22 If, by offering shares of the investment funds, the banks were deemed to be offering
securities, then the banks would be violating Glass-Steagall’s prohibition
on a bank’s engagement in the activity of offering securities.23 That the
question arose was not surprising: Ownership interests in investment
19. This doctrine appears both in the SEC’s regulatory interpretations and “noaction” letters and in its rulemaking under the securities statutes. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.2a51-3 (2013) (prohibiting company from being deemed “qualified purchaser”
under Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) if company was
“formed for the specific purpose” of making particular private fund investment, “unless
each beneficial owner of the company’s securities is a qualified purchaser”). The doctrine
is, moreover, consistent with Congress’s mandate in the securities laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-8(d) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person indirectly, or through or by any
other person, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do
directly under the provisions of this subchapter or any rule or regulation thereunder.”).
20. In particular, section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that “control persons”
might incur liability based on the actions of those under their control. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (mandating, with limited exceptions, that “[e]very person who, directly or
indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally . . . to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable”).
21. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,
78, 377–78 (1994)) (repealed 1999).
22. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624 (1971) (describing question presented as whether “creation and operation of an investment fund by a bank which offers to
its customers the opportunity to purchase an interest in the fund’s assets constitutes the
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing of securities or stocks in violation of” GlassSteagall Act); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 926–27 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (framing
question as whether to uphold Comptroller of the Currency’s determination that
Citibank’s organization and operation of “collective investment trust” complied with
requirements of Glass-Steagall Act).
23. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 625 (observing “[o]n their face, [sections] 16 and 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act appear clearly to prohibit” bank’s “issuing and selling stock or other
securities evidencing an undivided and redeemable interest in the assets of the fund”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Conover, 790 F.2d at 927–28 (noting “Glass-Steagall
Act prohibits national banks from engaging in the securities business”).
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funds were (and still are) generally thought to be securities, much like
ownership interests in entities that pursue noninvestment activities.24 The
interpretation urged by the banks, on the other hand, was, in essence,
that they were not offering securities. In their view, although the pooled
investment structure necessarily exists in the form of an entity (one that,
yes, offers and sells ownership interests), the structure exists solely to enable the banks to perform permissible banking services for multiple
customers simultaneously.25 In other words, the offerings should be
evaluated solely based on the substance of the services provided, rather
than the circumstance that a separate entity is involved. By countenancing that interpretation, as the courts sometimes did,26 the courts also
countenanced the inappropriateness of entity-centrism.
These exceptions show that approaches to regulation can be more
flexible and more malleable than entity-centrism permits, and that entitycentrism is not a regulatory necessity. The exceptions are, however,
exactly that—exceptional and sporadic—and, in any event, fail to engage
a broader analysis of entity-centrism as an animating regulatory principle.
Yet, if entity-centrism is not necessary and, indeed, may be counterproductive or harmful, what explains its existence and persistence?
Addressing that question is an additional challenge of this Article, one
that it can only begin to tackle. However, when one considers the history
of many types of financial services regulation, a few themes begin to
emerge. One is that much of financial services regulation arose as a
complement to “core” securities regulation, which very much has the
entity as its focus, and appropriately so.27 Other bases of entity-centrism
are more obscure but can be seen in an evaluation of how financial
services have changed over the past century, combined with the
circumstance that many laws and rules have remained largely dormant
over that time.28 Because those laws and rules have not (until recently, in
some cases) been put to the test, their entity-centric shortcomings have
not been discerned or challenged and, therefore, remain uncorrected.29

24. See Conover, 790 F.2d at 928 (observing SEC “ha[d] in the past opined that
ownership interests in collective trust funds are ‘securities’ for purposes of the federal
securities laws”).
25. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 634 (“It is argued that a bank investment fund simply
makes available to the small investor the benefit of investment management by a bank
trust department . . . and that . . . an investment fund creates no problems that are not
present whenever a bank invests in securities for the account of customers.”).
26. See Conover, 790 F.2d at 938 (affirming Comptroller’s conclusion that collective
investment trust at issue did not violate Glass-Steagall Act).
27. See infra Part III.A (suggesting entity-centrism may have arisen as extension of
entity focus of other components of securities laws).
28. See infra Part III.B (suggesting entity-centrism may be in part attributable to
policymakers’ failure to reevaluate decades-old laws and rules).
29. See infra Part III.B (describing this oversight and labeling it “regulatory
atrophy”).
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This Article contends that financial services regulation needs to look
past entity boundaries. Lawmakers and regulators need to think more
broadly to address the significant regulatory difficulties—such as regulators’ ineffective responses to customer harm, including the theft or misplacement of customer assets—that have arisen over the past several
years and that show no sign of abating. Addressing entity-centrism is one
way of doing that. Of course, with that argument a number of further
challenges present themselves. No longer regarding the entity as the
center of the regulatory universe would seem to mean introducing
tremendous additional complexity to a sphere of regulation that is
already all too complex. However, postponing the necessary reorientation of policy assumptions will not render that reorientation more
manageable later. It is time to begin replacing entity-centrism with a
greater focus on the practical effects and deficiencies of entity-centric
laws and rules.
This Article begins, in Part I, by describing the ways in which regulation of financial services firms is entity-centric. Focusing on provisions of
the securities laws and related rules pertaining to financial services, it
shows how entity-centrism is manifested in myriad aspects of that regulation, including registration requirements, discrete substantive obligations, and liquidation procedures. Using two recent regulatory failures as
case studies, Part II shows how the incongruence between regulation’s
entity-centrism, on the one hand, and the reality of how financial services
are provided, on the other, contradicts the primary objective of financial
services regulation: client and customer protection. This Part examines
the recent bankruptcy of MF Global, a futures brokerage firm that
became insolvent in 2011,30 and the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by the
Stanford Financial Group, which came to light in 2009.31 It contends
that, in both cases, the entity focus of relevant laws and rules deprived
victimized customers of the extensive protections those laws and rules
would otherwise have provided.
As a first step toward moving beyond entity-centrism in financial
services regulation, Part III delves into the bases of regulation’s fixation
on the stand-alone entity. It focuses on the influence of corporate
governance norms on the earliest forms of financial services laws and
rules and, further, suggests that some laws and rules have become weak
through disuse and insufficient critical evaluation of their core
deficiencies. Finally, in Part IV, the Article posits that, to achieve more
workable and effective financial services regulation, new approaches to
its formulation must emerge—approaches that not only acknowledge
and search for tendencies toward entity-centrism but that also address
the problem comprehensively. This Part points to circumstances in which
30. See infra Part II.A (describing entity-centrism of MF Global bankruptcy).
31. See infra Part II.B (describing entity-centrism of regulation of Stanford Financial
Group).
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lawmakers and regulators should be especially alert to an unwarranted
elevation of the entity over the ways in which financial services firms
actually operate and, in broad strokes, suggests proposals for overcoming
entity-centrism in specific regulatory contexts.
I. ENTITY-CENTRISM
Financial services regulation embodies entity-centrism, in that it is
largely premised on the notion that the entity is the appropriate unit of
regulation. “Entity” in this rubric encompasses any of the fundamental
organizational building blocks of a business enterprise, including, among
others, corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and
variations thereof (such as limited liability partnerships, limited liability
limited partnerships, S-corporations, and more).32 In focusing on
entities, financial services regulation tends to neglect how interentity
relationships and activities may further or impede regulatory objectives.
Instead, regulation is informed by corporate governance norms, which
characteristically have centered on the entity and, in particular, its
internal relationships and functions, usually without reference to persons
(individuals or other entities) outside the entity.33 Because corporate
governance norms structure the relationships between a firm’s management, on the one hand, and its shareholders, on the other, those norms
are, almost by definition, entity-focused. Indeed, corporate governance
principles have traditionally involved extra-entity persons only in
connection with shareholders’ failures to maintain entity integrity or
formalities.34 The most prominent example in this regard is a liability
doctrine commonly known as “veil piercing.” Under this doctrine, a
corporation’s controlling shareholder might be deemed responsible for
the firm’s financial liabilities, to the extent the shareholder effectively
was the corporation’s alter ego, using the corporation as a vehicle
through which the shareholder pursued her own activities and
objectives.35
To be sure, even in the corporate governance context, the law’s
inward focus has not been immune to challenge or criticism. In recent
years, for example, scholars and commentators have begun to question
the standard corporate focus on shareholders and, in particular, increasing shareholder value.36 Perhaps as a result of such challenges, various
32. See Smith & Williams, supra note 14, at 93–95 (discussing differences between
entity forms).
33. See id. at 197–204 (describing respective rights and roles of directors and shareholders as participants in corporate management).
34. See id. at 222–23 (discussing circumstances in which corporation’s liabilities
might be imposed directly against shareholder based on shareholder’s conduct).
35. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study,
76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1039–43 (1991) (describing corporate veil piercing doctrine).
36. See Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First
Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public, at vi (2012) (questioning and criticizing
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states have adopted so-called “other constituency” statutes.37 These
statutes authorize corporate directors, in their decisionmaking, to consider factors beyond shareholders’ interests, such as how a decision
might affect employees, the environment, or the community as a whole.38
In addition, because the very role of the board of directors as entity
decisionmakers embodies an inward, entity-based focus, some scholars
have come to question the notion of placing ultimate corporate
management authority in the corporate board.39 These analyses at least
implicitly question the entity-centrism of corporate governance
principles, notwithstanding that the subject of corporate governance is
undeniably the single, solitary corporate entity. If one can reasonably
question entity-centrism in the realm of corporate governance, then
surely it deserves a critical analysis in financial services regulation. Yet
until now that analysis has not occurred in any meaningful way.
As the case studies in Part II elaborate, this regulatory myopia has
meant that financial services regulation is less effective than it might
“conventional shareholder value thinking”); Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and
the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. Corp. L. 975, 1001 (2006) (questioning, based
on AOL Time Warner merger, “whether shareholder wealth maximization should really
be the ultimate arbiter of corporate value”); Robert Sprague, Beyond Shareholder Value:
Normative Standards for Sustainable Corporate Governance, 1 William & Mary Bus. L.
Rev. 47, 72–81 (2010) (arguing against “shareholder primacy approach to corporate
governance”); Gordon Pearson, The Truth About Shareholder Primacy, Guardian (Apr.
27, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/short-termismshareholder-long-term-leadership (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The world—
business leaders, politicians, academics, and even the people in the street—have come to
believe that it is the legal duty of those who run businesses to maximise the wealth of
shareholders, and to hell with everything else. But it is simply not the case.”).
37. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 491.101B (1999) (“A director, in determining what is in
the best interest of the corporation when considering a tender offer or proposal of
acquisition, merger, consolidation, or similar proposal, may consider [a number of]
community interest factors . . . .”); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B, § 65 (2013) (providing directors, in determining corporation’s best interests, may consider, among other things, “the
interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy
of the state, region and nation, [and] community and societal considerations”); 15 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1715 (West 2013) (providing directors, in carrying out duties, may
consider how any action might affect “employees, suppliers, customers[,] . . . creditors[,]”
and local communities, in addition to shareholders).
38. Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus.
Law. 1355, 1355 (1991) (“The typical [other constituency] statute provides that in acting
in the best interests of the corporation, the directors may take into account the interests of
a variety of constituencies other than shareholders, including employees, the communities
in which facilities of the corporation are located, customers, and suppliers.”); Amir N.
Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style,
29 Del. J. Corp. L. 649, 700–05 (2004) (summarizing history, content, and efficacy of other
constituency statutes).
39. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev.
783, 785–86 (2011) (“Corporate officers and the investors and parties in interest that are
essential to the firm’s daily operation and capital structure—the real corporate decision
makers—should perform the functions assigned to the board, so that the now-vestigial
board of directors can completely wither away.”).
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otherwise be. With a view toward providing context for that discussion,
this Part describes, in general terms, how entity-centrism has manifested
itself in financial services regulation. It does so by focusing primarily,
though not exclusively, on regulation of firms providing securities-related
financial services. Although financial services regulation subsumes not
only securities regulation (some aspects of it, at least40) but also
commodity futures regulation, banking regulation, and insurance regulation,41 securities regulation is perhaps the most prominent and
controversial component of financial services regulation. It encompasses
not only regulation of securities broker-dealers, which serve as intermediaries for securities transactions, but also regulation of mutual funds
(and other registered investment companies) and investment advisers,
which manage accounts on behalf of securities investors, from mutual
funds to hedge funds to individuals.42 Part I.A discusses how, as to a
variety of securities-related financial services, entity-centric principles
determine the regulatory subject. Part I.B describes ways in which entitycentrism counters regulatory goals, focusing on the investment advisory
and mutual fund contexts and introducing the entity-centric concerns
that arise in connection with resolving or liquidating insolvent financial
services firms.
A. The Subject of Regulation
Entity-centrism is evident in the fundamental matter of designating
the regulatory subject. A firm’s financial services activities may require
the firm to register under the appropriate regulatory regime and, thereafter, to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements and become subject to
examinations and possible enforcement proceedings by the relevant
regulator. A firm that desires to perform investment advisory services, for
example, must satisfy investment adviser registration requirements and
thereby become regulated by either the SEC43 or the appropriate state
securities regulator(s).44 If, as is often the case, the “firm” consists of
40. See infra notes 249–255 and accompanying text (describing components of
securities regulation also regarded as financial services regulation).
41. That “financial services regulation” encompasses all of these categories of regulation is evident in the fact that each was a subject of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010), and that this statute is characterized as a “substantial overhaul of the regulation of
all providers of financial services.” Sarah Jane Hughes, Developments in the Laws
Governing Electronic Payments, 67 Bus. Law. 259, 259 (2011).
42. See James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman & Donald C. Langevoort, Securities
Regulation: Cases and Materials 1075–79, 1093–99 (6th ed. 2009) (summarizing regulation of investment advisers and registered investment companies under Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) and Investment Company Act).
43. The relevant federal statute is the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21
(2012).
44. See Staff of the Inv. Adviser Regulation Office, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC,
Regulation of Investment Advisers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 8–9
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multiple entities, it must cause certain of those entities, depending on
their functions, to become so registered. Accordingly, the particular
entities that become registered as investment advisers are also, not
surprisingly, the units that are required to comply with regulatory
requirements and the units through which the firm must provide its
investment advisory services to clients.45 Moreover, the investment adviser
registration and regulation of any particular entity typically occurs
separately from, and independently of, the registration and regulation of
any other entity.46
The same goes for firms aiming to act as securities broker-dealers,
which buy and sell securities either as intermediary agents (meaning they
bear no risk and receive commissions as compensation) or as principals
(meaning they transact for their own account and, accordingly, bear the
associated risk).47 A firm’s becoming registered as a broker-dealer
involves its registering the relevant entity or entities with the SEC under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)48 and subjecting
those entities to the SEC’s ongoing regulatory supervision.49 Similarly, a
firm seeking to sponsor50 mutual funds or other publicly offered investment companies must, in order to do so, register the “company” (that is,
the fund, an entity) with the SEC under the Investment Company Act of
(2013) [hereinafter SEC, Regulation of Investment Advisers], available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting role of states in regulating investment advisers). Investment
adviser regulation governs investment advisers to investment vehicles, such as mutual
funds and hedge funds, as well as to other types of advisory clients, such as individuals and
endowments. See id. at 8–17 (listing types of investment advisers required to become
registered under Advisers Act).
45. To be sure, in the registration process, the registering entity may be required to
disclose to the regulator the existence of affiliated entities, yet the affiliates are not
themselves directly subject to the regulatory requirements that accompany registration.
See id. at 18–19.
46. Cf. American Bar Association, Business Law Section, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012
WL 160552, at *4 (Jan. 18, 2012) (noting investment adviser registration form “was not
designed to combine information about separately formed advisers that conduct different
advisory businesses, even if those advisers are related to each other because of a control
relationship”).
47. See SEC, Form BD, Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer Registration 2,
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formbd.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (requiring any broker-dealer applicant to indicate
whether it is corporation, partnership, limited liability company, sole proprietorship, or
“other” and to state where “applicant entity” was incorporated, filed its partnership
agreement, or was formed).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78kk.
49. See Div. of Trading & Mkts., SEC, Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 2008), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/bdguide.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing broker-dealer regulation).
50. “Sponsoring” a fund generally encompasses orchestrating the fund’s formation,
coordinating the fund’s arrangements with its investment adviser(s) and other service
providers, and overseeing the commencement of the fund’s activities and the fund’s
ongoing operations.
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1940 (“Investment Company Act”)51 and comply with the associated
obligations.52
The imposition of registration requirements and substantive obligations on entities, as opposed to super- or supra-entity units, holds also in
nonsecurities contexts. For example, firms desiring to act as futures
commission merchants, which serve as brokers for transactions involving
commodity futures, similarly must submit to regulation as such by registering an entity with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“Commodity
Exchange Act”)53 and, thereafter, must cause that entity to adhere to the
associated regulatory strictures.54 Firms that intend to act as commodity
trading advisors (the investment-adviser counterparts to accounts that
pursue commodity futures trading activities rather than securitiesfocused activities) or commodity pool operators, which sponsor funds
that pursue commodity futures trading, must similarly register an entity
with the CFTC, with that entity becoming subject to regulatory oversight.55
Despite the prevalence of this entity-based approach to regulatory
registration and compliance, it may strike one as odd (at best) to hone in
on the phenomenon as an example of entity-centrism. After all, not only
are entity-registration requirements customary and uncontroversial, they
perhaps seem eminently sensible. If a firm wishes to perform financial
services, then the “who” or the “what” that will actually do the work needs
to be defined. To the extent the services-providing activity can be confined within an entity, then should not that entity be the regulatory
subject? Entity-centrism, in other words, makes things easy and likely
conforms to how consumers of financial services have come to conceive
of the suppliers of those services.56
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64. The Investment Company Act governs not only
mutual funds but also other publicly offered investment vehicles, such as exchange-traded
funds.
52. See Investment Company Registration and Regulation Package, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/invcoreg121504.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last modified Dec. 21, 2004) (summarizing investment company
regulation).
53. See 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to be a
futures commission merchant unless . . . such person shall have registered . . . with the
[Commodity Futures Trading] Commission . . . .”).
54. See Futures Commission Merchants (FCMs) & Introducing Brokers (IBs), U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
Intermediaries/FCMs/index.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct.
7, 2013) (summarizing regulatory requirements applicable to FCMs).
55. See Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) & Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs),
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/
Intermediaries/CPOs/index.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct.
7, 2013) (summarizing regulatory requirements applicable to CTAs and CPOs).
56. For example, an investor who wishes for a portfolio manager employed by
Citigroup Alternative Investments to manage her retirement account assets need only
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For present purposes, the point is simply that, even for the
seemingly pedestrian matter of defining the regulatory subject, designating the entity as the regulatory unit is not the only possible option. For
example, in the mutual fund context, rather than the fund being the
“registrant” subject to investment company regulation, the regulatory
subject could instead be those who have been engaged to provide
investment advice to the mutual fund and, indirectly, to its
shareholders.57 That approach would be more desirable, for example,
based on the recognition that a mutual fund may be viewed merely as a
facilitating structure, one that allows the fund’s investment adviser to
provide advisory services to the fund’s shareholders.58 From that
perspective, directing regulatory obligations toward those who control
the fund and are responsible for its existence and ongoing operations
may better promote regulatory goals.59
Similarly, in theory, the subject of broker-dealer or investment
adviser regulation could, instead, be the (multi-entity) enterprise itself or
even subentity divisions within the enterprise.60 Such an approach might
be more desirable to the extent that the activities of any particular entity
within the enterprise are determined based on factors other than the
performance of a particular kind of financial service. For example, if a
division (involving only a portion of the employees) of a U.K. Morgan
Stanley entity and a division (involving only a portion of the employees)
of a U.S. Morgan Stanley entity provide investment advisory services only
to U.S. institutional investors, then, in the name of achieving more
efficient and streamlined regulation, it may make sense for those two
divisions to be jointly subject to U.S. investment adviser regulation—and
only that regulation. Under the entity-based approach, however, in
addition to the U.S. entity being separately registered and regulated in
enter into an agreement with that entity, which, as one might imagine, is registered and
regulated as an investment adviser. Investment Adviser Public Disclosure: Citigroup
Alternative Investments LLC, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.adviserinfo.sec
.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd_landing.aspx?SearchGroup=Firm&FirmKey=119537&B
rokerKey=-1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). If, instead,
the investor would like to open a brokerage account with Citigroup, she will enter into an
agreement with a Citigroup entity that is registered and regulated as a broker-dealer.
57. See Anita K. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument: The Limitations of the
Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 305–11 (2013)
[hereinafter Krug, Investment Company as Instrument] (arguing investment company
regulation would better further its goals by focusing on investment company’s investment
adviser, rather than on company and its board of directors).
58. See id. at 265–66 (observing mutual funds exist “solely to facilitate the provision
of investment advice to [mutual fund] shareholders”).
59. See id. at 311 (arguing mutual fund regulation focusing on fund’s investment
adviser would be “more coherent[] and ultimately . . . more effective” than regulation
focusing on mutual fund itself).
60. The latter approach might make sense to the extent that it is more coherent,
from a functional perspective, for divisions within different entities to be involved in the
provision of the relevant financial services.
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the United States (and, quite possibly, the United Kingdom), based on
each type of financial services it provides and where those services are
provided, the U.K. entity likewise would be registered and regulated in
both the United Kingdom and the United States.61
Finally, consider an arrangement in which portfolio managers or
other personnel within a financial services firm provide a number of
distinct types of investment advisory services through separate entities.
The group may, through one entity, provide discretionary investment
advisory services focusing on positions in equities and instruments
derivative of equities. The group might, at the same time, and through a
different entity, carry out investment advisory services focusing on real
estate and real estate securities. In these circumstances, the separation of
the investment advisory services into two separate entities may promote
organizational efficiency and serve the goal of associating liabilities
arising from a particular type of advisory activity with the assets
underlying that activity.62 Yet, in light of the common ownership and
personnel, allowing both entities to become jointly registered and
treated as a single unit may create substantial regulatory efficiencies, in
the sense of permitting lower compliance costs (for the firm) and lower
oversight costs (for the SEC or other relevant regulators).
This discussion suggests that making the entity the discrete regulatory subject, as opposed to entity subcomponents or supercomponents,
does not necessarily achieve anything that one of these alternative
approaches could not achieve, except that the entity-based approach may
be a more bright line specification of what is to be regulated.63 There is
61. See, e.g., SEC, Regulation of Investment Advisers, supra note 44, at 7 (“Non-U.S.
persons advising U.S. persons are subject to the [Investment Advisers] Act and must
register under the Act . . . .”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2012) (requiring any
investment adviser to register pursuant to Advisers Act before lawfully making use of
instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Banco Espirito Santo S.A., Securities Act
Release No. 9270, Exchange Act Release No. 65,608, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3304, 2011 WL 5039037 (Oct. 24, 2011) (issuing cease-and-desist order and determining
Portugal-based bank that was not registered with SEC and offered brokerage services to
U.S. customers violated sections of Securities Act of 1933, Exchange Act, and Advisers
Act); cf. Remarks by Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 715, 716 (2005)
(observing “[a]s large U.S. banks have expanded their international operations, they
have . . . become subject to supervision in their host countries,” and “as foreign banking
organizations . . . have established [branches in the United States] . . . they, too[,] have
become subject to additional supervision”).
62. In a variation of this structure, a single management group might oversee two or
more groups of personnel that carry out different types of financial services through
separate entities under the parent company’s umbrella.
63. It is also worth considering, however, whether the entity-based approach actually
delineates the regulatory object more clearly. To the extent that, for example, components of different entities perform financial services activities as part of the larger enterprise, regulation of those activities under the existing approach means registration of
multiple entities, with each one independently satisfying the relevant regulatory requirements. See supra notes 43–55 and accompanying text (describing how, in various financial
services contexts, entity is regulatory subject). By recognizing that different entities may be
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no need to reach a definitive conclusion on that possibility. The
discussion, however, frames a deeper evaluation of financial services
regulation and, in particular, an examination of other contexts in which
entity-centrism grounds legal rules and analysis but in which that circumstance is less obvious and its rationale less intuitive. Indeed, as the next
section highlights, in multiple respects regulation’s entity-centrism is
inconsistent with the ways in which financial services firms actually
operate. Moreover, as shown by the financial regulatory failures
described in Part II, entity-centrism in these other contexts more
decidedly fails to further the financial services regulatory objectives of
protecting clients and customers and promoting market integrity.
B. The Dysfunctions of Regulation
The activities of many financial services entities are but components
of a single, larger financial services enterprise represented by a parent or
holding company.64 Put another way, financial services “firms” are not so
much firms at all, if that term is defined narrowly to refer to discrete
legal persons.65 However, as the previous section indicated, the propensity of regulation to focus on discrete entities within an enterprise may
run counter to regulatory efficiency.66 The fragmentation that arises
from regulatory fixation on the entity may obscure the nature of
relationships between entities, including possible conflicts of interest that
may arise by virtue of those relationships. Whereas the previous section’s
discussion of the entity-based regulatory approach was largely theoretical,
intended to suggest the plausibility of alternative approaches, this section
turns to other contexts in which entity-centrism is evident and in which
the desirability of considering alternative approaches is more apparent.
1. Investment Advisers. — Returning to the world of investment
adviser regulation, entity-centrism can be found in regulatory doctrine
governing advisory activities for privately offered funds, including hedge
involved with the enterprise’s broader financial services activities, presumably registration
and regulation could become more streamlined and efficient for both the regulated and
the regulator.
64. See James A. Fanto, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do”: Should Financial
Conglomerates Be Dismantled?, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 553, 553 (2010) (noting many brokerdealers “operate within the [financial] conglomerate structure”); Martin J. Gruenberg,
Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
speeches/chairman/spmay1012.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Large
financial companies conduct business through multiple subsidiary legal entities with many
interconnections owned by a parent holding company.”).
65. See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding
Companies, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 507, 509 (1994) (describing how modern financial services
institutions “operate . . . typically through a network of subsidiaries specializing in deposittaking, insurance underwriting, securities activities, and various other financial services”).
66. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (suggesting possible reasons to
focus regulation on units other than entity).
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funds and private equity funds. For most purposes under the investment
adviser regulatory framework, the fund itself—the entity—rather than
those who hold ownership interests in it—the investors—is regarded as
the “client” of the investment adviser that manages the fund’s assets.67 By
virtue of its client status, the fund is entitled to the regulatory protections
of, as the case may be, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers
Act”)68 or applicable state securities laws.69 The investors, however,
generally are not given those protections.
At first glance, this arrangement might not seem particularly
problematic, given that the fund—and not its investors—is the direct
recipient of the adviser’s investment advice.70 After all, as a legal matter,
it is the fund’s assets that are deployed to buy and sell securities and
other investment instruments. The distinction between an individual’s
investing directly and investing through a fund is, however, only
superficial. When an investor enters into a direct relationship with an
investment adviser, the investment adviser manages the investor’s assets,
which are usually held in a separate account under the investor’s name,
apart from anyone else’s assets.71 By contrast, when an investor invests in
a hedge fund, for example, the investor does not execute a contract with
the adviser but instead enters into a subscription agreement with the
fund, pursuant to which the investor places her assets in the fund. In
those circumstances, although the fund is the legal owner of the
securities in its portfolio, the investor (indirectly) has a proportionate
interest in each of those securities by virtue of her holding a
proportionate interest in the fund.72

67. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.202(a)(30)-1 (2013) (noting, for purposes of identifying
“client” of “foreign private adviser,” “partnership, limited liability company, trust . . . , or
other legal organization . . . to which [the adviser] provide[s] investment advice based on
its investment objectives rather than the individual investment objectives of its [investors]”
may be deemed single client).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012).
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (observing investment advisers may be
governed by state regulatory authorities rather than by SEC).
70. See Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 62 Fed. Reg. 15,098, 15,102 (Mar. 31, 1997) (noting, although “client of an
investment adviser typically is provided with individualized advice[,] . . . [an adviser of an
investment company] has no obligation to ensure that each security purchased for the
company’s portfolio is an appropriate investment for each shareholder”).
71. Ian Salisbury, SMAs Beat Funds in 2008, Wall St. J. (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123679669243098151.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting separately managed accounts (SMAs) “are a type of fee-based
account” whose assets are invested by investment adviser on account holder’s behalf, and
SMAs differ from mutual funds in that investors in latter “own shares in a single pool of
assets,” whereas SMA holders “own their stocks directly”).
72. See Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, U.S. Senate Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools and Secrecy 250
(2006) (observing hedge funds “pool investor contributions to trade in securities” and
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The fund structure—one might also call it a pooled investment
structure—is, at its foundation, a convenience mechanism. It is a method
for an investment adviser to aggregate the assets of institutions and
individuals that, at one time, would have been direct clients of the
adviser.73 That is, those who might otherwise have engaged investment
advisers to manage their assets directly—and who would, in those circumstances, be considered advisory clients—now increasingly place their
assets with their advisers of choice through investments in hedge funds,
private equity funds, and other pooled investment entities that the
advisers manage.74 In this structure, an adviser’s formal, contractual
relationship is with the fund rather than with any investor in the fund.
This restructuring of investment relationships is, by and large, a
product of advisers’ determination that pooling investor assets in a fund
structure creates management efficiencies, at least when an adviser
manages most or all of the assets under its management in accordance
with a single investment strategy, as opposed to tailoring its management
services on a client-by-client basis.75 The ultimate services an investor
receives are virtually the same, regardless of whether the advisory relationship is direct or occurs through a pooled structure.76 Yet, in terms of
how regulation “covers” the investor—the person whose assets ultimately
are at stake—the distinction is critical. To reformulate the point, an
investor’s investment in a private fund does not make that person a
“client” of the fund’s investment adviser, even though, had the investor
engaged the adviser directly, the investor would have client status and the
regulatory protections that come with it.77 Those regulatory protections
hedge fund investor “generally sign[s] a ‘subscription agreement’ specifying the investor’s
ownership interest in the fund”).
73. See Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for “Hedge Fund Regulation”: A
Reconsideration of “Client” Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 55 Vill. L. Rev.
661, 690–91 (2010) [hereinafter Krug, A Reconsideration of Client] (describing efficiency
rationale for “pooled asset structure”).
74. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 45,172, 45,173 (July 28, 2004) (“Instead of managing client money directly, [a
growing number of investment] advisers pool client assets by creating limited
partnerships, business trusts or corporations in which clients invest.”); Steven M. Davidoff,
Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 Brooklyn J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 339, 349 (2008) (observing “sophisticated investors” increasingly place
investment assets in hedge funds and other private funds).
75. See Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and the
Hedge Fund Problem, 63 Hastings L.J. 1, 25 (2011) (“Investment funds . . . are ideal
investment-management vehicles for those advisers who effectively offer strategies rather
than more personal advisory services.”).
76. See id. at 24–26 (describing evolution of structure of investment advisory relationships).
77. See id. at 27–30 (describing who is deemed advisory client for regulatory purposes). Although investment advisers are deemed to owe fiduciary duties to both the fund
and its investors, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963),
those duties are not defined, either by statute or rule, and may be (and typically are)
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include the right to receive required disclosures regarding the adviser’s
business activities and conflicts of interest78 and the right to provide
consent (or not) to certain transactions the adviser may propose for the
investor, such as securities transactions as to which the adviser has a conflict of interest.79
To be sure, an investor’s losing the client status she would otherwise
enjoy simply because she obtains advisory services in an intermediated
format might cause scant concern if regarding the fund as the client
achieved countervailing protections for investors. That might be the case
if, for example, an independent fiduciary represented the fund on
investors’ behalf. That is not the typical arrangement, however. To the
contrary, since the fund is usually a creature of the adviser’s creation, it is
typically under the adviser’s control, and the fund’s decisions are thus
typically dictated, directly or indirectly, by the adviser.80 Accordingly, the
fund has no “voice” independent of the adviser’s, and its words and
actions should in no way be regarded as reflective or representative of
the interests of its beneficial owners,81 the investors.82
The definition of “client” is only one instance of entity-centrism in
the investment advisory context. Another involves the composition of
investment advisory firms. Entrepreneurs often form two separate entities
limited by contract. Accordingly, fiduciary obligations arguably do not provide meaningful
protections to fund investors.
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3 (2013) (requiring SEC-registered investment adviser,
on at least annual basis, to deliver to clients disclosure document containing “all
information required by Part 2 of Form ADV”). Part 2 of Form ADV is a disclosure document that each adviser must submit to the SEC on an annual basis and that contains
information regarding all aspects of the adviser’s business, including conflicts of interest
and other risks that may affect the adviser’s management of client accounts. See SEC,
Instructions for Part 2A of Form ADV: Preparing Your Firm Brochure 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part2.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (“As a fiduciary, [an adviser] ha[s] an ongoing obligation
to inform [its] clients of any material information that could affect the advisory
relationship.”).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2) (2012) (providing SEC-registered adviser may not
enter into advisory contract that “fails to provide . . . that no assignment of such contract
shall be made by the investment adviser without the consent of the other party to the
contract”); id. § 80b-6(3) (prohibiting adviser from buying security from, or selling
security to, client account unless adviser first obtains client’s consent to transaction).
80. See Krug, A Reconsideration of Client, supra note 73, at 673 (“In the world of
hedge funds and other private funds, . . . a prevalent model is for the adviser . . . to have
control of the fund, either as its ‘sponsor’ . . . or as its general partner or manager.”).
81. “Beneficial owners” as to any particular fund refers to those whose assets are at
risk in the fund or, put another way, those who have the “benefits” of ownership of the
fund. Black’s Law Dictionary 1214 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “beneficial owner” as “[o]ne
recognized in equity as the owner of something because use and title belong to that
person, even though legal title may belong to someone else”).
82. See Krug, A Reconsideration of Client, supra note 73, at 672–77 (describing
investor protection concerns arising from circumstance that fund’s investment adviser
typically controls fund and speaks on its behalf).
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for the purpose of operating one or more hedge funds or other private
funds. To avoid certain adverse tax consequences, the entrepreneurs may
form one entity to manage the fund’s portfolio investments and a second
entity to be its general partner or managing member.83 Both entities play
roles in the management and administration of the fund. Yet, pursuant
to federal regulation, only the entity that formally acts as the investment
adviser is required to become registered and regulated as such.84 By
contrast, some state regulators have reached a different conclusion and
have required both entities to be separately registered and regulated,85
thereby producing duplicative compliance costs for registrants and an
inefficient use of regulatory resources. Regardless of whether one or
both entities are ultimately subject to regulation, however, the circumstance that regulation centers on discrete entities means that form
trumps substance.
Additionally, the entity-centrism that weakens investment adviser
regulation also pervades investors’ and others’ understanding of that
regulation and hinders their reliance on it, worsening entity-centrism’s
effects. For example, entity-centrism is apparent in the “due diligence”
questionnaires that many investors require their prospective investment
advisers to complete so that the investors may obtain additional
information about the advisers’ business activities.86 Questionnaires often
ask about regulatory matters, such as whether any enforcement actions
have been brought against a prospective adviser.87 Reflecting regulation’s
entity-centrism, the questionnaires sometimes inquire only about the
83. See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Business Law, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2005 WL 3334980, at *28 (Dec. 8, 2005) (“[An] adviser to a private fund often
establishes a special purpose vehicle . . . to act as the fund’s general partner or managing
member.”); SEC, Regulation of Investment Advisers, supra note 44, at 18–19 (describing
regulatory implications of adviser’s use of special purpose general partner entities).
84. See SEC, Regulation of Investment Advisers, supra note 44, at 18–19 (describing
requirements to be met for special purpose general partner entity set up by registered
investment adviser so as not to have to register separately as investment adviser).
85. For example, until 2010, California followed that approach. See Cal. Corps.
Comm’r Op. 7132, Commissioner’s Opinion 10/1 C, at 6 (2010), available at
http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Commissioner/Opinions/pdf/OP7132.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (concurring that California Corporations Commission would not
take regulatory action against general partner entity in multi-entity investment advisory
firm, provided firm complies with certain requirements).
86. See What Is a Due Diligence Questionnaire?, wiseGEEK, http://
www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-due-diligence-questionnaire.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (“A due diligence questionnaire is a thorough
checklist to help a prospective investor collect information about a potential
investment . . . .”).
87. See, e.g., Managed Funds Ass’n, Model Due Diligence Questionnaire for Hedge
Fund Investors, at I.G.1–2 (2011), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/Due-Dilligence-Questionnaire.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (exemplifying due diligence questionnaire inquiring whether investment
adviser answering questionnaire has been subject to criminal or administrative
proceedings).
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entity that is the adviser, overlooking the commonplace prospect that an
adviser’s principals may own a number of other advisory entities—entities
that, though not the subject of the questionnaire, may have been the
subject of regulatory actions about which most investors would wish to
know.
Prevailing doctrine, then, privileges the formalism of the entity. In
the process, it curtails regulatory protections and may also impede the
efficient use of regulatory resources. More coherent, and less entity-centric, approaches would aim to give force to regulatory objectives. Such
approaches might, for example, “look through” the entity to bestow at
least some protections on the entity’s investors or regard a multi-entity
advisory firm as a single regulatory unit.
2. Mutual Funds. — Entity-centrism also plagues the regulation of
mutual funds and other publicly offered funds (formally known as
investment companies). Because mutual funds are available to retail
investors, they are, in contrast to private funds, subject to comprehensive
regulation, which is set forth in the Investment Company Act88 and the
associated SEC rules.89 That regulation is primarily aimed at mutual
funds’ boards of directors and relies on the directors’ status as fiduciaries
to the fund and its shareholders.90 Like other corporate boards, a mutual
fund’s board has formal decisionmaking authority and, therefore, performs such tasks as formally approving the appointment of the fund’s
service providers, formally establishing the fund’s valuation policies and
procedures, and formally determining whether to authorize new classes
of shares.91 Also like other corporate boards, the fund’s board has an
oversight function and must stay apprised of the fund’s activities and
operations.92
By focusing on the persons nominally governing the fund, regulation centers on the entity with which shareholders formally have a relationship. Regulation centers on the fund, in other words. Like a private
fund, however, that entity is but a means, or a mechanism, through
which the investment adviser provides its services93 and, in many respects,

88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012).
89. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1 to 270.60a-1 (2013).
90. See Indep. Dirs. Council, Fundamentals for Newer Directors 10 (2011), available
at http://www.idc.org/pdf/idc_11_fundamentals.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[Mutual fund] [d]irectors have a fiduciary duty to represent the interests of the
fund’s shareholders . . . .”).
91. A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal &
Econometric Analysis, 33 J. Corp. L. 745, 750 (2008) (detailing boards of directors’
responsibilities under Investment Company Act).
92. See id. at 750–51 (observing mutual fund boards have “watchdog” role and
perform “monitoring function”).
93. See Ben L. Fernandez, The Duties of Mutual Fund Independent Trustees with
Respect to the Investment Advisory Fee, Bos. B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 12, 12–13 (observing
that, by investing in mutual funds, investors select investment advisers).
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is under the adviser’s control.94 And, much like an investment adviser to
private funds, an adviser managing a mutual fund is typically the reason
the fund exists.95 That is, the adviser decides to create the fund as a
mechanism to provide advisory services in an aggregated, pooled
fashion.96 The adviser, moreover, is often primarily responsible for selecting not only the fund’s service providers, such as its administrator, its
distributors, and its auditor,97 but also the members of the fund’s initial
board of directors.98 Finally, it is usually the adviser’s own employees who
serve as the mutual fund’s chief compliance officer and any other officers
the fund might have.99 Accordingly, in this context, too, the fund can be
seen as a mere facilitator of the adviser’s provision of advisory services.100
The investment adviser’s fundamental role vis-à-vis a mutual fund
that it manages means that the fund’s board is to some extent beholden

94. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Control of a
mutual fund . . . lies largely in the hands of the investment adviser . . . .”).
95. See S. Rep. No. 91-184, at 5 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901
(noting separately owned and controlled investment adviser creates, markets, and
manages most mutual funds).
96. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480–81 (1979) (“A mutual fund is a pool of
assets, consisting primarily of portfolio securities, and belonging to the individual investors
holding shares in the fund.” (citing Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 405)).
97. Cf. Tannenbaum, 552 F.2d at 405 (observing investment adviser has responsibility
for mutual fund’s operations).
98. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L.J. 84, 92 (2010) (noting mutual
funds “are typically organized by their advisers, and their boards of directors are initially
selected by advisers”).
99. See Indep. Dirs. Council, supra note 90, at 4 (noting mutual fund’s officers are
typically employees of fund’s investment adviser). Under the Investment Company Act
rules, each investment company is required to have a chief compliance officer. 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.38a-1(a)(4) (2013).
100. Not surprisingly, and consistent with the regulatory approach to private funds, it
is the mutual fund itself, rather than its shareholders, that is the advisory client and therefore entitled to the relevant regulatory protections. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011) (deciding whether investment adviser
“can be held liable . . . for false statements” contained in prospectuses of adviser’s “client
mutual funds[]”). In contrast to the private fund context, however, mutual fund
shareholders would likely not be direct clients of the adviser. Mutual funds are designed
and regulated to be suitable for investments by so-called retail investors—in other words,
investors “who lack investing experience and sophistication” or who do not have
substantial investment assets. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1025 (2009). Such
investors generally do not fit the profile of a direct advisory client, simply because of the
associated inefficiencies. That is, for an investment adviser, managing numerous small
accounts may not be worthwhile, considering the associated costs and anticipated financial
benefits. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting common
trust funds permit banks to manage individuals’ trust accounts where those accounts “are
too small to be managed individually”). Accordingly, in contrast to the private fund
context, an investor’s placing assets in a mutual fund does not entail her losing the client
status she might otherwise have.
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to the adviser and, therefore, not truly independent of it.101 That, in turn,
means that the board may be ineffective in its role as a fiduciary to the
fund and its shareholders, including in such matters as negotiating the
fees the adviser will charge the fund and evaluating the adviser’s activities
on the fund’s behalf.102 Moreover, the difficulties arising from regulation’s failure to acknowledge mutual funds’ multi-entity structure are
compounded by courts’ following suit, embracing entity-focused
principles in adjudicating claims involving mutual funds. As just one
example,103 in dismissing a fraud claim against a mutual fund’s investment adviser premised on the inclusion of misleading statements in the
fund’s offering documents, the Supreme Court reasoned that the adviser
could not be deemed the “maker” of the statements, notwithstanding
that the adviser effectively controlled the fund, because the fund was the
entity that had formally issued the documents, and the adviser was a
separate entity from the fund.104
In short, given the typically close relationship between the adviser
and the board, the board’s associated conflicts of interest, and courts’
concomitant reliance on corporate governance principles, it is doubtful
that regulation’s formal focus on the entity and, specifically, its governing
body serves the professed objectives of mutual fund regulation. More
effective and less entity-centric regulation might, instead, center on the
person or organization that is, in fact, primarily responsible for the
fund’s existence and its success or failure. That is, regulation would focus
on the investment adviser: It would recognize the adviser as providing
services to the mutual fund’s shareholders (albeit in an intermediated
format); specify what the adviser must and cannot do in carrying out its
activities on the fund’s behalf, such as in connection with determining
fees payable by the fund; and dispense with a meaningful regulatory role
for the fund’s board of directors.
3. Insolvency and Bankruptcy. — Entity-centrism is also apparent in the
laws and rules governing the liquidation of financial services firms in
101. Krug, Investment Company as Instrument, supra note 57, at 283 (arguing
mutual fund’s board members are not independent of investment adviser in part because
of desire for future board appointments).
102. See Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund
Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 497, 530–31 (2008)
(recommending different standards of fiduciary duty in cases involving fees to counter
concern that mutual fund directors are not sufficiently independent from fund’s investment adviser).
103. For other examples, see Krug, Investment Company as Instrument, supra note
57, at 289–99 (describing various ways in which courts, in cases involving mutual funds,
elevate entity-centric corporate governance norms over investor protection objectives of
securities regulation).
104. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion in 2011 in Janus Capital Group, 131
S. Ct. 2296. In doing so, it rejected the plaintiff’s compelling contention that “an
investment adviser should generally be understood to be the ‘maker’ of statements by its
client mutual fund, like a playwright whose lines are delivered by an actor.” Id. at 2304.
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connection with their insolvencies or bankruptcies. Although a financial
services firm may consist of a number of separate entities, those entities
often operate cohesively, united in pursuing jointly shared business
goals. Indeed, that fact should not be particularly surprising, given the
typical structure of the financial services firm, in which one entity—the
parent company—directly or indirectly owns and controls the other
entities in an often complex parent-subsidiary structure.105 The enterprise is able to act as a single firm because the various subsidiaries
effectively have the status of assets of the parent company, subject to the
parent company’s use and manipulation.106 That structure, moreover, is
simply a product of corporate law principles. The parent company, as the
subsidiaries’ controlling shareholder, has the power to elect and replace
the members of the subsidiaries’ respective boards of directors and, in
that capacity, may be said to control the boards and their decisions.107
Therefore, the structure stands in contrast to a group of entities that,
lacking common control or ownership, are able to act independently of
one another.
However, as described more concretely in the case studies presented
in Part II, the laws and rules governing financial services firms’
insolvencies or bankruptcies evince problematic entity-centrism. For one
thing, in the event the parent company, or even one of the subsidiary
entities, becomes insolvent, it need not be the case that the other entities
within the enterprise will meet a similar fate.108 This is entity-centrism at
105. See Williamson v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1663-N, 2006 WL 1586375, at
*4 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006) (“The fact that an allegedly controlling shareholder appointed
its affiliates to the board of directors is one of many factors Delaware courts have
considered in analyzing whether a shareholder is controlling.”); Gruenberg, supra note 64
(observing “corporate structure” of large financial firms with multiple lines of business
that operate globally “is likely to be a holding company [structure] with a parent at the top
and multiple layers of subsidiaries”).
106. Cf. Gruenberg, supra note 64 (noting, in large financial holding company
structures, “intra-company risk transfers and financial relationships will not be
transparent”). Among other things, parent companies have been known to conduct their
proprietary trading or other business activities through their subsidiaries or by using subsidiary assets. See, e.g., Disclosure Statement for the Plan of Liquidation for MF Global
Holdings Ltd., MF Global Finance USA Inc., and Their Debtor Affiliates at 13–17, In re
MF Global Holdings Ltd., 481 B.R. 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-15059 (MG))
[hereinafter MF Global Plan Disclosure Statement], 2013 WL 485943, available at
http://mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/995_15059.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing how MF Global’s parent company used various subsidiaries to carry
out firm’s proprietary investment strategy).
107. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1203, 1263 (2002) (“Controlling
shareholders can ensure that their interests are fully represented on the subsidiary’s board
of directors, or by commonly employed officers, as well as that they have influence over
both large and small corporate decisions, either directly, for some decisions, or through
the board.”).
108. Nonetheless, “[a] resolution of the individual subsidiaries of the financial
company would increase the likelihood of disruption and loss of franchise value by
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work, albeit in a largely benign manner: Given the adverse consequences
of bankruptcy for creditors, it is difficult to quibble with any entity’s
survival, even in the midst of its affiliates’ demise.
Beyond that, however, given the close ownership ties among the
entities in the group, it is likely that the insolvency of one entity, particularly the parent company, will cause at least some others to follow suit.109
The 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a large financial services conglomerate, is illustrative of that phenomenon.110 In bankruptcy,
moreover, the role of the parent company as the repository of, and
authority over, the “assets” that are the subsidiaries is often replaced—
rather jarringly—by bankruptcy trustees, administrators, liquidators, and,
sometimes, receivers.111 Whereas prior to bankruptcy each of the entities
was, in some form or another, operated by the parent company for the
furtherance (however defined) of the enterprise as a whole, in bankruptcy the connections between entities are broken and the affiliations
severed.112 The entities are taken over by independent parties whose
objectives are to recover for “their” particular entity and corresponding
disrupting the interrelationships among the subsidiary companies.” Gruenberg, supra
note 64.
109. See Standard & Poor’s, RatingsDirect: Corporate Criteria—Parent/Subsidiary
Links; General Principles; Subsidiaries/Joint Ventures/Nonrecourse Projects; Finance
Subsidiaries; Rating Link to Parent 2–3 (2004), available at http://www.maalot.co.il/
data/uploads/pdfs/1.Parent_Subsidiary.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting “‘strong’ subsidiary is no further from bankruptcy than its parent” and
subsidiaries’ credit ratings are generally no higher than that of parent company, in light of
“likelihood that a parent’s bankruptcy would cause the subsidiary’s bankruptcy, regardless
of its stand-alone strength”).
110. See Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy
Case as Suitors Balk (Update4), Bloomberg (Sept. 15, 2008, 9:43 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awh5hRyXkvs4&refer=japa
n (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the fourthlargest U.S. investment bank, succumbed to the subprime mortgage crisis it helped create
in the biggest bankruptcy filing in history.”).
111. To be sure, the approach differs depending on whether the bankruptcy is filed
under Chapter 11 or under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, in Chapter
11 bankruptcies, it is not necessarily the case that a trustee will be appointed to replace the
debtor’s management. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (allowing court to appoint
trustee “for cause” or “if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity
security holders, and other interests of the estate”). Despite the Bankruptcy Code’s more
flexible approach in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, courts have appointed trustees in some
Chapter 11 bankruptcies, including the bankruptcy of MF Global Holdings Ltd. See Ben
Berkowitz, Former FBI Director Appointed MF Global Trustee, Reuters (Nov. 25, 2011,
9:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/26/us-mfglobal-trustee-idUSTRE7AP
02Q20111126 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting appointment of trustee to
oversee MF Global’s bankruptcy).
112. See, e.g., Daniel P. Collins, MF Global Trustee Reports Show Folly of Bankruptcy
Process, Futures (June 8, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/06/08/mf-globaltrustee-reports-show-folly-of-bankruptcy (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (observing
trustees for different MF Global entities “are tossing around accusations against various
entities that while a going concern, worked as one business with one leader”).
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group of creditors as much of the bankrupt entity’s property as
possible.113 Even where an insolvent entity’s directors remain in control,
the directors must now carry out their duties for the benefit of those
creditors.114 As one might surmise, each of these professionals is likely to
claim to have rights to the same limited property.115
At the point of insolvency, then, it becomes amply clear that entitycentrism is alive and well. The entities comprising the enterprise become
the independent, self-contained legal beings that regulation has tended
to assume they are. The fluid and cohesive, in other words, is supplanted
by the ossified and (often) warring, all because the enterprise happened
to be structured as a collection of separate entities rather than as a single,
albeit complex, one.116 Because of the hindsight that bankruptcy invites,
if not requires, and the spotlight it shines on regulatory shortcomings,
Part II pursues these considerations, discussing two recent financial
services firm bankruptcies. The discussion shows, in concrete terms, how
entity-centrism in financial services regulation, encompassing regulation
that applies in both pre- and postbankruptcy contexts, is not merely an
academic concern.
II. CASUALTIES OF ENTITY-CENTRISM
As Part I describes, financial services regulation is the regulation of
financial services firms, not only over the span of their operations, but
also during their liquidations. Financial services regulation, in other
words, governs both the life and the death of the firm, and, indeed, some
laws and rules that help define the firm’s activities also govern its
cessation of them. The preceding Part highlights a few of the ways in

113. See Bankr. Judges Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Basics 76
(rev. 3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/
BankruptcyResources/bankbasics2011.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
bankruptcy trustee has responsibility to act “principally for the benefit of the unsecured
creditors” and to “recover property” of estate).
114. See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate
Failures, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 15 n.50 (2003) (“Directors of insolvent firms are
deemed to have fiduciary duties to creditors because shareholders’ residual interests in an
insolvent firm are worthless and cannot be paid until creditors’ claims are paid in full.”).
115. See Daniel P. Collins, MF Global Trustees Square Off, Futures (May 1, 2012),
http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/05/01/mf-global-trustees-square-off (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“As the MF Global debacle has dragged on, [it] has become
apparent . . . that the two trustees are on a collision course as they battle for what’s left of
the bankrupt firm.”).
116. In the apt words of an official of the U.K. Financial Services Authority, discussing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, “[F]inancial institutions may be global in life, but
they are national in death—they become a series of local legal entities when they become
subject to administration and/or liquidation.” Thomas Huertas, Dir., Banking Sector, Fin.
Servs. Auth., The Rationale for and Limits of Bank Supervision (Jan. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0119_th.shtml (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).

2013]

ESCAPING ENTITY-CENTRISM

2067

which laws and rules governing financial services firms are entity-centric.
Firms are regulated through particular entities, with each entity that performs particular services registering with the appropriate authority and
complying with the associated obligations separately from any other
entity. Applicable doctrine affords client protections to hedge funds and
other private funds, rather than to their investors, even though the entity
that is the fund, created and controlled by its investment adviser, is but a
mechanism to aggregate would-be clients.117 Regulation of mutual funds
and other public funds centers on the entity that is the fund, even
though something beyond the fund—namely, its investment adviser—is
responsible for what the fund is and does.118 In bankruptcy and liquidation, law treats a financial services firm as a compilation of discrete and
independent entities, even though, prior to bankruptcy, those entities
operated as a cohesive unit.119
This Part focuses on two recent bankruptcies that reveal not only the
significant shortcomings of financial services regulation, but also that
those shortcomings are the product of regulation’s entity-centered
formulation. Their facts are particularly interesting and, more
importantly, show entity-centrism’s pathologies in a particularly stark
manner. Each firm’s demise occurred under circumstances very different
from those of the other’s. Although Lehman Brothers and Bernard
Madoff may readily come to mind (and although both likewise evince
problematic entity-centrism), the firms discussed in this Part have
received far less attention, as have the regulatory failures they have made
apparent. Moreover, each firm’s collapse occurred after the financial
crisis had mostly run its course. The firms are MF Global and the group
of companies owned by R. Allen Stanford. These two episodes, discussed
in Part II.A and II.B, respectively, are instructive not because the laws and
rules governing bankruptcies in the financial services context are any
more entity-centric or problematic than the laws and rules governing
financial services firms’ day-to-day activities. Indeed, some of the most
troublesome aspects of these episodes and, in particular, the rules and
norms governing them do not involve the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the
case studies are instructive for the simple reason that financial services
catastrophes are litmus tests for the efficacy of financial services regulation. We might think of such events as the ultraviolet lights that
illuminate how failures of financial services regulation may be traced to
entity-centrism.

117. See supra notes 67–82 and accompanying text (discussing investment adviser
regulation as example of entity-centrism).
118. See supra Part I.B.2 (highlighting how mutual fund regulation inappropriately
centers on entity that is fund and fails to acknowledge multi-entity structures).
119. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing bankruptcy doctrine’s entity-centric assumptions).

2068

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:2039

A. MF Global
1. The Enterprise Structure. — MF Global was a broker-dealer registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act and a futures commission
merchant registered with the CFTC under the Commodity Exchange Act.
In one form or another, it had been around for almost 230 years, originating in 1783 England as James Man’s sugar trading business.120 The
firm, which became known as E.D.&F. Man in 1869,121 ultimately became
an asset management firm named Man Group PLC, pursuing its global
brokerage business under the name Man Financial.122 In 2007, Man
Group spun off Man Financial, in the process changing the latter’s name
to MF Global.123 Soon thereafter, MF Global commenced an initial public
offering.124 Jon Corzine became MF Global’s CEO in March 2010 and
resigned from that position nineteen months later, on November 4,
2011, four days after the firm filed for bankruptcy.125
Referring to MF Global as an “it,” however, is a bit misleading
because the firm was a multi-entity, multinational enterprise, consisting
of at least fifty separate entities.126 The MF Global entity that went bank120. Staff Report Prepared for Rep. Randy Neugebauer, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Oversight & Investigations, Committee on Financial Services 5 (2012) [hereinafter Staff
Report], available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/256882456288524
.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“MF Global traces its origin back 229 years to a
sugar brokerage business founded by James Man in London in 1783.”); Jill Treanor, MF
Group’s Trading Roots Stretch Back Two Centuries, Guardian (Oct. 31, 2012, 10:32 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/31/mf-global-trading-history (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting “MF Global group can still trace its roots back to” James
Man’s sugar brokerage business).
121. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 5 (“In 1869, the business became known as
E.D.&F. Man.”).
122. See id. (observing E.D.&F. Man “had $1 billion in funds under management” by
1994 and Man Financial had been “Man Group’s global brokerage business[]”).
123. See Jacob Bunge, MF Global: History from IPO to Bankruptcy, Wall St. J.: Deal J.
(Oct. 31, 2011, 11:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31/mf-global-historyfrom-ipo-to-bankruptcy/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting MF Global began
in 2007 “as a spinoff of U.K. hedge-fund firm Man Financial”).
124. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 7 (“On July 18, 2007, MF Global announced
an initial public offering . . . .”).
125. See Aaron Lucchetti & Mike Spector, The Unraveling of MF Global, Wall St. J.
(Dec. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Lucchetti & Spector, Unraveling of MF Global],
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203686204577117114075444418.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “Mr. Corzine’s tenure began in March
2010”); Ben Protess & Kevin Roose, Corzine Resigns from MF Global, N.Y. Times:
Dealbook (Nov. 4, 2011, 7:50 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/corzineresigns-from-mf-global/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting Jon Corzine’s
resignation).
126. See Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 for Entry of
Order Approving Settlement Agreement Between the Debtor, the Trustee, MF Global UK
Ltd. (in Special Administration) and MFGUK Joint Special Administrators at 4, In re MF
Global Inc., 481 B.R. 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/mfgimfguksette
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rupt and that “caused” the bankruptcies of most of the other entities was
the parent company, MF Global Holdings Ltd. (“Holdings”).127 The
ultimate cause of the bankruptcy—a fascinating topic but of lesser
importance for present purposes—was its CEO’s inappropriate trading
and investment activities on the firm’s behalf.128 Mr. Corzine had made
an enormous bet on European sovereign debt, one that relied on
leverage such that, when European countries’ credit ratings were substantially downgraded in the fall of 2011, MF Global’s lenders (or, more
accurately, its “repo” counterparties129) sought additional collateral that
the firm was unable to supply.130 The drain on assets caused by the
default risk associated with European debt and by MF Global’s own
credit-rating downgrade—combined with the termination of negotiations

ment122112.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“MFG Holdings . . . was the
parent of nearly fifty direct or indirect subsidiaries . . . .”). The large number of entities
comprising “MF Global” is evident from its organizational chart. See MF Global Plan
Disclosure Statement, supra note 106, at 90 (graphically depicting MF Global’s
organizational structure).
127. Michael J. de la Merced & Ben Protess, MF Global Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
Times: Dealbook (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/
mf-global-files-for-bankruptcy/?ref=mfgloballtd (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting Holdings’s bankruptcy filing).
128. See Complaint at 56–57, Freeh v. Corzine (In re MF Global Holdings Ltd.), No.
11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Holdings Complaint],
2013 WL 2472173 (contending Jon Corzine and other Holdings officers breached
fiduciary duty of care based on, among other things, trading strategies they pursued on
Holdings’s behalf); Report of Investigation of Louis J. Freeh, Chapter 11 Trustee of MF
Global Holdings Ltd., et al. at 97, In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Report of Investigation of Louis J. Freeh],
available at http://www.mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/1279_15059.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“Corzine’s bet on the Euro RTMs exposed [MF Global] to an
excessive level of risk.”).
129. “Repos”—short for “repurchase agreements”—are financial instruments that
constitute “a method of short-term borrowing.” Alan N. Rechtschaffen, Capital Markets,
Derivatives and the Law 149–50 (2009). In particular, “repos” involve the “borrower’s” sale
of securities to the “lender,” with the sale price constituting the loan. See id. (comparing
security sales in repos to use of collateral in loans). The borrower subsequently repurchases the securities from the lender at a price that includes an extra amount equivalent
to interest. See What Is a Repo?, Int’l Capital Mkt. Ass’n, http://www.icmagroup.
org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequentlyasked-questions-on-repo/1-what-is-a-repo/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Oct. 7, 2013) (“The difference between the price paid by the buyer at the start of a
repo and the price he receives at the end is his return on the cash that he is effectively
lending to the seller.”). From an economic perspective, repos function like secured loans,
in that the securities serve as collateral. Rechtschaffen, supra, at 150.
130. See Matthew Leising, MF Global’s $310 Million Margin Call on Last Day
Exceeded Its Market Value, Bloomberg (Feb. 6, 2012, 7:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2012-02-06/mf-global-faced-a-310-million-margin-call-on-futures-broker-s-finalday.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing MF Global’s liquidity crisis in
its final days).
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with the firm’s only plausible buyer131—left bankruptcy as MF Global’s
only option.132
In life, MF Global operated as securities and futures brokerage firms
typically do these days. The parent company, Holdings, did not itself
provide brokerage or other financial services to customers.133 Accordingly, it was neither registered with nor regulated by any financial regulatory authority in any capacity.134 It did, however, pursue business activities
of a sort, namely, proprietary trading activities, in which it traded and
invested in securities (and possibly other instruments) for its own
account.135 Although Holdings could potentially have carried out these

131. The prospective buyer, Interactive Brokers LLC, was primarily interested in
buying MF Global Inc. (the U.S. brokerage subsidiary) or substantially all of that entity’s
assets. See John L. Roe & James L. Koutoulas, Commodity Customer Coal., White Paper:
Background, Impacts & Solutions to MF Global’s Bankruptcy 7 (2012), available at
http://commoditycustomercoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CCC-WhitePaper-MF-Global-Bankruptcy-Revised-5-9-121.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“The MFGH parent firm sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on October 31, 2011
after an acquisition of MFGI’s commodities accounts by rival firm Interactive Brokers fell
through.”); cf. Ben Protess et al., Regulators Investigating MF Global for Missing Money,
N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Oct. 31, 2011, 9:55 PM), http://dealbook. nytimes.com/2011/10/
31/regulators-investigating-mf-global/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(“[Interactive Brokers] coveted only MF Global’s futures and securities customers.”).
“When MF Global informed Interactive Brokers of the shortfall of customer funds, the
company withdrew from negotiations.” Staff Report, supra note 120, at 73.
132. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 54–73 (describing MF Global’s collapse and
observing “MF Global faced a liquidity drain of crisis proportions”); see also Report of
Investigation of Louis J. Freeh, supra note 128, at 103–04 (describing margin calls MF
Global received immediately prior to bankruptcy); Lucchetti & Spector, Unraveling of MF
Global, supra note 125 (summarizing events leading to MF Global’s bankruptcy); Kevin
McCoy, Bankrupt Brokerage MF Global Showed Appetite for Risk, USA Today (Nov. 9,
2011, 8:25 PM), http://usatoday.com/money/industries/brokerage/story/2011-11-10/mfglobal-warningsigns/51145024/1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“MF Global filed
for bankruptcy court protection on Oct. 31 when efforts to find a buyer for the company
broke down amid signs that an estimated $600 million in customer funds could not be
accounted for.”).
133. Cf. The Collapse of MF Global: Lessons Learned and Policy Implications:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 50 (2012)
(statement of Robert Cook, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission) [hereinafter Cook Testimony] (“MF Global Holdings Ltd. . . . was
a publicly traded holding company that conducted financial activities through a number
of subsidiaries located in various countries.”).
134. Cf. id. (describing various regulatory regimes to which subsidiaries, as entities
providing financial services, were subject).
135. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 30 (describing how, under Corzine’s leadership, MF Global increasingly “looked to proprietary trading . . . as a way to further boost
revenues”); Editorial, MF Global Meltdown Shows the Wisdom of Prop-Trading Limits:
View, Bloomberg (Oct. 31, 2011, 7:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1031/mf-global-meltdown-shows-the-wisdom-of-prop-trading-limits-view.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (recounting how, upon his arrival at MF Global, “Corzine pumped
up the firm’s proprietary trading desk, using its small base of capital to buy European
sovereign debt”).
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activities directly, in a manner that did not involve any of its subsidiaries,
it instead conducted them largely through several of its subsidiaries or
units or divisions of those subsidiaries.136 Holdings’s European sovereign
debt investments were at the core of the firm’s trading strategy, which, as
Mr. Corzine originally conceived it, would not cause the firm to bear any
risk.137 For their part, the MF Global subsidiaries were the entities that
actually provided financial services and were regulated as such, depending on what any particular subsidiary did and the jurisdiction in which it
was located.138
The firm maintained operations in the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and Singapore, in addition to the United States. In the United
States, MF Global Inc. was the entity performing brokerage services,
whereas, in the U.K., it was MF Global UK Ltd.; in Singapore, it was MF
Global Singapore Pte. Ltd.; and so on.139 Brokerage customers “signed
136. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 35 (describing how, in furtherance of MF
Global’s proprietary trading strategy, MF Global UK bought European bonds, which it
then sold to MF Global Inc., which used bonds “as collateral in intercompany [repo-tomaturity (RTM)] transactions with MFGUK [which] . . . then entered into further RTM
transactions”); Report of Investigation of Louis J. Freeh, supra note 128, at 26–27 (“MFG
UK entered into the trades because it, and not MFGI, was a member of the relevant
clearinghouses . . . .”).
137. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 35 (noting Corzine’s belief that his trading
strategy “could book instant profits for MF Global without affecting its balance sheet”);
John Carney, The Trade That Killed MF Global, CNBC (Nov. 2, 2011, 12:02 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/45132384/The_Trade_That_Killed_MF_Global (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (observing MF Global had been pursuing “what it viewed as a
nearly risk-free trade, hoping to make money in a very old fashioned way—skimming the
spread as a middle man”). This strategy is known as repo-to-maturity. See Staff Report,
supra note 120, at 31–36 (discussing mechanics of repo-to-maturity agreement). The
notion was that the loans—or, more precisely, repurchase agreements, see supra note 129
(explaining repurchase agreements)—that MF Global obtained to purchase bonds on
European sovereign debt generally had the same maturity as the bonds themselves. See
Report of Investigation of Louis J. Freeh, supra note 128, at 27 (“The maturity of the
securities underlying the Euro RTMs matched the maturity of the financing provided
under MFG UK’s repos . . . with one difference.”). Assuming, as Mr. Corzine mistakenly
did, that the bonds would retain their value until maturity, then, by using the bonds as
collateral for the loans (or, more precisely, by selling them to the lenders on the condition
that MF Global would repurchase them at maturity) the strategy presented no risk to MF
Global. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 31–36 (describing proprietary trading strategy
Corzine implemented on behalf of MF Global). At the end of the bonds’ term, MF Global
would have earned the interest on those bonds, which was marginally higher than the
interest MF Global was obligated to pay for the loans (or, more precisely, the difference
between the price at which the lenders purchased the bonds and the price at which MF
Global was obligated to repurchase them). See id. (indicating key technical assumptions of
Corzine’s trading strategy).
138. See Cook Testimony, supra note 133, at 1–2 (summarizing regulation to which
certain subsidiaries were subject); Staff Report, supra note 120, at 21–22 (observing MF
Global had “six regulated subsidiaries, five of which were located outside of the United
States”).
139. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 22 (listing regulated subsidiaries and regulatory regime to which each was subject); see also ICE Clear Eur., MF Global Client
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up” with whatever subsidiary was appropriate in light of their brokerage
needs and geographic location. Nonetheless, with Holdings and, more
specifically, Mr. Corzine at the helm, the various entities were operated
as a single enterprise. Decisionmaking was centralized in Holdings, and
each subsidiary’s assets and resources were deployed in furtherance of
enterprise objectives—again, typical of other large financial services
firms.140 In light of Holdings’s control relationship (whether direct or
indirect) over each of the subsidiaries, Mr. Corzine and other officers
formally employed by that entity could cause the movement of assets
among the entities for various purposes.141 That they did so, moreover,
need not have given rise to any regulatory or corporate governance
concerns.142 Indeed, so long as the regulated entities complied with their
obligations and the subsidiaries maintained (and Holdings respected)
corporate formalities, the entities’ working together as a single unit may
have been both efficient and productive.
2. The Plunge into Bankruptcy. — Until the music stopped. By
September 2011, it had become apparent to reasonably close observers
that Holdings was in precarious financial health as a result of the worsening European debt crisis and the circumstance that MF Global held substantial “long” positions in that continent’s sovereign debt.143 As the
firm’s financial condition continued to deteriorate through October
2011, its lenders sought to protect themselves by demanding additional
collateral, while those MF Global shareholders and bondholders who
were aware of the firm’s plight similarly sought to abandon their
Information Update 1 (2011), available at https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_
europe/circulars/C11181.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“MF Global
conducted its business through a number of subsidiaries worldwide, including MF Global
Inc., MF Global UK Ltd, MF Global Singapore Pte. Limited, MF Global Hong Kong Ltd,
MF Global Australia Limited and MF Global Canada Co.”).
140. See Cook Testimony, supra note 133, at 50–52 (noting Holdings conducted its
activities through number of subsidiaries); Elaine Knuth, MF Global’s Original Sin,
Futures (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.futuresmag.com/2012/11/01/mf-globals-original-sin
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting various MF Global entities “operated as one
entity”).
141. See, e.g., Staff Report, supra note 120, at 57, 64 (describing how Holdings
needed to “inject” capital into MF Global Inc. and transferred funds from MF Global Inc.
to MF Global UK); Holdings Complaint, supra note 128, at 25 (“Corzine caused MFGI to
enter into the Euro RTM trades.”).
142. Although the congressional report on MF Global flags numerous regulatory
concerns, the apparently commonplace transfer of funds among the various MF Global
entities was not among those concerns. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 50–72 (listing
regulatory concerns prior to MF Global’s bankruptcy but not referencing funds transfers).
143. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 46 (noting Holdings disclosed in its May
2011 10-K report that “its net position in European RTM trades was $6.3 billion”); Azam
Ahmed & Ben Protess, To Avoid Raising Capital, MF Global Moved Around Sovereign
Debt, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (June 5, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/06/05/to-avoid-regulatory-scrutiny-mf-global-moved-around-sovereign-debt (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing MF Global’s “$6 billion bet on European
sovereign debt”).

2013]

ESCAPING ENTITY-CENTRISM

2073

positions.144 The firm’s regulators, including the CFTC and the firm’s
“designated self-regulatory organization,”145 the Commodity Mercantile
Exchange Group (CME), stepped onto the scene, quite literally.146 Each
established a “physical presence” in the firm’s Chicago office, meaning
one of the offices of MF Global Inc., the U.S. brokerage subsidiary.147
Regulators’ primary role at such times of stress is to monitor the
firm’s continued compliance with its regulatory obligations.148 For MF
Global, perhaps the most important regulatory requirement was ensuring
the integrity of the funds and assets that brokerage customers had placed
in custody with the firm for purposes of their futures trading activities.149
An additional aim for regulators was to work with MF Global’s management to secure a buyer for the firm, with the hopes of effecting a seam144. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 59 (describing how in MF Global’s final
days, lenders, customers, and shareholders sought to cut ties with firm); Peter Elkind with
Doris Burke, The Last Days of MF Global, CNNMoney (June 4, 2012, 3:17 PM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/04/the-last-days-of-mf-global/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (observing by close of trading on October 25, 2011, “MF Global
shares had dropped 48%, to $1.86”; “[c]ustomers were demanding their money and
closing accounts; [and] counterparties and lenders were cutting off credit”).
145. Staff Report, supra note 120, at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See Bryan Durkin, Chief Operating Officer, Commodity Mercantile Exch. Grp.,
Address Before the National Grain and Feed Association 40th Annual Country Elevator
Conference (Dec. 12, 2011), in Jackie Roembke, CME Group Discusses MF Global
Bankruptcy, Feed & Grain (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.feedandgrain.com/article/
10525740/cme-group-discusses-mf-global-bankruptcy (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (detailing CME’s presence in MF Global’s offices at end of October 2011); Elkind
with Burke, supra note 144 (noting CFTC personnel had been “on the ground” at MF
Global before bankruptcy).
147. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 69 (referring to “CFTC staff in MF Global’s
Chicago office”); Durkin, supra note 146 (noting CME auditors were in “MF Global’s
Chicago offices” on October 27 and 28, 2011).
148. Cf. Staff Report, supra note 120, at 61 (observing in MF Global’s final week
“[t]he SEC advised [MF Global Inc.] that it wanted to meet with the company’s
managers . . . to discuss liquidity, funding, financial statement condition, and regulatory
computations, and that the CFTC would also participate”); Durkin, supra note 146
(describing CME’s focus on MF Global’s regulatory compliance as latter became
insolvent).
149. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 67–70 (describing regulators’ efforts in MF
Global’s final days to verify customer account balances); Elkind with Burke, supra note 144
(“[MF Global’s] primary business was handling trades that allowed hedging and
speculation in such things as pork bellies, metals, and foreign currencies.”). Some of MF
Global’s customers pursued trading and investments in securities. However, out of the
customer accounts at MF Global Inc. at the time it declared bankruptcy, about 36,000 were
held by futures customers, whereas fewer than 350 were held by securities customers. See
Staff Report, supra note 120, at 1 (“At the time of MF Global’s bankruptcy, the company
served approximately 36,000 futures customers and 318 securities customers.”); Linda
Sandler, MF Global Judge Tells Trustee to Disclose More JPMorgan Work, Bloomberg
Businessweek (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-07/mf-globaljudge-tells-trustee-to-disclose-more-jpmorgan-work.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting transfer of “about 38,000 commodity accounts to other firms” and “plans
to sell 330 securities accounts”).
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less continuation of the firm’s brokerage operations.150 Although MF
Global initially believed that it had found a willing buyer in Interactive
Brokers, an online brokerage firm,151 the desired deal did not materialize,152 leading Holdings to file for bankruptcy, with proceedings carried
out under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.153
As for MF Global Inc., the SEC, after discussions with CFTC representatives, placed the entity into a liquidation proceeding under the
Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA),154 a statute enacted in 1970 to
protect securities brokerage customers in the event of a broker-dealer’s
insolvency.155 It quickly became apparent that the deal with Interactive
Brokers had failed and that bankruptcy was the only remaining option
because MF Global had discovered a very large discrepancy between the
amount of funds the firm—in particular, MF Global Inc.—should have
held in its custodial accounts for brokerage customers and the amount of
funds that it actually held in those accounts.156 There was, in other words,
a substantial “shortfall.”157 The trustee that the bankruptcy court
appointed to liquidate MF Global Inc. ultimately determined that the
shortfall, originally estimated to be approximately $900 million, was
instead approximately $1.6 billion.158

150. See Mike Spector, Aaron Lucchetti & Liam Plevin, Corzine Firm’s Final
Struggles, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203
716204577018113636278598.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (observing in MF
Global’s final days “regulators were worried about the run on the firm and hoped a
rescuer would swoop in”).
151. Staff Report, supra note 120, at 67 (“Corzine had identified Interactive Brokers,
LLC as a potential buyer, and executives for both companies worked through the weekend
to negotiate the terms of a deal.”).
152. See de la Merced & Protess, supra note 127 (reporting Interactive Brokers’s concerns about MF Global’s “capital levels” led prospective buyer “to call off the deal”).
153. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 73 (“MF Global filed for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”).
154. See id. (“[T]he Securities Investor Protection Corporation commenced a
proceeding to liquidate [MF Global Inc.] under [SIPA].”); Mike Spector & Aaron
Lucchetti, SIPC Expected to Name Trustee for MF Global Brokerage, Wall St. J. (Oct. 31,
2011, 4:45 PM) [hereinafter Spector & Lucchetti, SIPC Expected to Name Trustee],
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204528204577010240782392380.html#a
rticleTabs%3Darticle (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[SIPC] is poised to appoint
a trustee to take over MF Global Holdings Ltd.’s brokerage . . . .”).
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (2012).
156. See Holdings Complaint, supra note 128, at 56 (“On October 30, 2011, . . . a sale
to a third party collapsed when [MF Global] informed the would-be buyer that it had
identified a potential significant shortfall in customer segregated funds.”).
157. Staff Report, supra note 120, at 1.
158. See id. (“[I]t is now known that MF Global’s collapse resulted in a $1.6 billion
shortfall in customer funds.”); Ben Protess, MF Global Trustee Sees $1.6 Billion Customer
Shortfall, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Feb. 10, 2012, 8:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/02/10/mf-global-trustee-sees-1-6-billion-customer-shortfall/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting $1.6 billion as revised estimate of shortfall amount).
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3. Entity-Based Battles for Assets. — Consistent with the discussion in
Part I.B, in MF Global’s death, the operation of MF Global as a multipart
enterprise was supplanted, all too abruptly, by an entity-centric
entrenchment and conflict among the MF Global subsidiaries.159 Once in
the throes of bankruptcy, each MF Global entity was treated as a separate
unit, independent of the other entities within the MF Global enterprise.160 Put another way, at the time the entity came to owe its corporate
governance obligations to its creditors, rather than to its equity owners—
a natural consequence of being in bankruptcy161—regarding the enterprise and its myriad entity components as a cohesive whole became
impossible, almost by definition. After all, the functioning of entities as
part of a larger business depended on common ownership of, or some
other ownership-based affiliation among, those entities. For MF Global,
recall, Holdings owned each other MF Global entity, whether directly or
through another MF Global entity.162 However, ownership is almost
irrelevant in bankruptcy, a status of drained equity and a resulting governance focus on creditors.163 More precisely, because an entity’s equity
owners (shareholders or partners, for example) have lowest priority in
bankruptcy payouts, the trustees or directors controlling a bankrupt
entity are generally obliged to further the interests—and abide by the
wishes—of the entity’s creditors, as the top-priority constituency.164
Accordingly, after Holdings ceased to be a component of each entity’s
governance structure, the connections among the affiliated entities could
be expected to dissipate.

159. See supra Part I.B.3 (describing how, in bankruptcy, entities in multi-entity
enterprises pursue entity-based interests, often in opposition to affiliate entities’ interests).
160. See Nick Brown, MF Global Trustees Resolve Fight over $130 Mln CME
Settlement, Chi. Trib. (July 27, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-0727/news/sns-rt-mfglobal-cmel2e8irb2y-20120727_1_mf-global-customers-james-giddens-sh
ortfall-in-customer-accounts (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“With both sides
facing shortfalls, the trustees are liable to butt heads over entitlement to various pots of
money . . . .”); Ben Protess, Freeh Calls for Peace in Fight over MF Global Money, N.Y.
Times: Dealbook (Aug. 29, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/29/
freeh-calls-for-peace-in-fight-over-mf-global-money/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing how trustees of various MF Global entities “spent months feuding” in efforts to
collect funds to pay entities’ respective creditors and customers).
161. See supra notes 109–115 and accompanying text (describing how entity’s bankruptcy modifies obligations owed by entity’s management).
162. See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text (describing MF Global’s
organizational structure).
163. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text (explaining bankrupt entity’s
management has obligations to entity’s creditors).
164. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. Legal Analysis 511, 538 (2009) (finding, based on empirical analyses,
“among large privately and publicly held businesses, creditor control is pervasive” and
“[e]quity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization
process”).

2076

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:2039

In theory, at least, under the current bankruptcy legal regime, a
bankruptcy of related entities could involve a consolidation in which, for
purposes of the bankruptcy liquidation proceedings, the entities are
regarded as one, with their assets and liabilities regarded as the assets
and liabilities of a single debtor.165 “Substantive consolidation,” as the
equitable doctrine is formally called,166 may be appropriate when, for
example, a creditor has been duped into extending credit, which might
be the case if the debtor led the creditor to believe that the debtor
owned assets that were, in fact, owned by the debtor’s affiliates.167 It has
also been used in circumstances in which the debtor’s and its affiliates’
assets are intertwined to the extent that attempting to sort them out
would injure all creditors.168 However, courts have traditionally viewed
substantive consolidation as an extraordinary remedy.169 Beyond that, it is
not a strong prospect in bankruptcies of financial services firms because
of the differing bankruptcy regulatory regimes to which different entities
are necessarily subject. As an initial matter, a subsidiary based in a
foreign jurisdiction will be liquidated in accordance with the laws and
165. See J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A
Primer, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 207, 208 (1990) (“Substantive consolidation is a powerful vehicle
in bankruptcy by which the assets and liabilities of one or more entities are combined and
treated for bankruptcy purposes as belonging to a single enterprise.”); see also Timothy E.
Graulich, Substantive Consolidation—A Post-Modern Trend, 14 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev.
527, 527 (2006) (“Essentially, for purposes of distribution in bankruptcy, substantive
consolidation treats multiple entities as if they were one.”); Peter J. Lahny IV, Asset
Securitization: A Discussion of the Traditional Bankruptcy Attacks and an Analysis of the
Next Potential Attack, Substantive Consolidation, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 815, 859
(2001) (observing upon substantive consolidation “court treats the assets and liabilities of
at least two separate, but affiliated entities as if they were the assets and liabilities of a
single bankruptcy debtor”). The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly contemplate
substantive consolidation. Rather, courts have crafted the doctrine from the power
conferred under § 105(a) of the Code, which authorizes courts to “issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out” the Code’s provisions.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
166. See Gilbert, supra note 165, at 208 (characterizing substantive consolidation as
“equitable remedy”).
167. See Graulich, supra note 165, at 539–42 (summarizing cases in which courts
have required substantive consolidation to address debtors’ fraudulent or misleading
conduct vis-à-vis creditors).
168. See id. at 543–44 (describing use of substantive consolidation in circumstances
where debtors are “unable to ‘unscramble’ their assets and liabilities (at least without
depleting the estate in the process and thereby reducing or eliminating creditor
recoveries)”). However, there is no uniform test courts apply to determine whether substantive consolidation is appropriate for any particular bankruptcy. See In re Bonham, 229
F.3d 750, 765 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing “[n]o uniform guideline for determining when to
order substantive consolidation has emerged” and “only through a searching review of the
record, on a case-by-case basis, can a court ensure that substantive consolidation effects its
sole aim: fairness to all creditors” (quoting FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. See Graulich, supra note 165, at 528 n.8 (listing cases articulating that substantive consolidation should be invoked sparingly).
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rules of that jurisdiction.170 More importantly, even for entities based in
the same country, such as Holdings and MF Global Inc., the entity or
entities that are regulated securities brokerages generally must be liquidated in accordance with SIPA, whereas the entities that are not so regulated will be wound up under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.171 At the very least, then, under current U.S. laws and rules,
substantive consolidation cannot be counted on to stave off the entitybased liquidation of the enterprise.172
Accordingly, in the case of MF Global, the court appointed a trustee
or administrator for each insolvent entity, and, for the most part, each
entity claimed, through its trustee or administrator, that one or more
other MF Global entities owed it money.173 The irony of that circumstance becomes evident when one considers the fate of the customer
funds that went missing from MF Global Inc.’s custodial accounts. As
expected, MF Global Inc.’s trustee determined that Holdings had used a
considerable portion of the missing funds to meet its lenders’ demands
for additional collateral.174 Or, more precisely, he determined that
Holdings’s and MF Global Inc.’s management caused the customer funds
to be used to meet the former entity’s funding needs.175 That use, even if
unlawful, was possible by virtue of the entities’ affiliations and functioning as an operationally coordinated enterprise.

170. See, e.g., First Report of Louis J. Freeh, Chapter 11 Trustee of MF Global
Holdings Ltd., et al., for the Period October 31, 2011 Through June 4, 2012, at 53–72, In
re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed June 4, 2012), 2012
WL 2002765, available at http://mfglobalcaseinfo.com/pdflib/711_15059.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing liquidation status of various non-U.S. MF
Global entities); cf. Staff Report, supra note 120, at 95–96 (observing “disposition of
funds” held by MF Global UK “was subject to British law when MFGUK entered into
administration following the collapse of its U.S. affiliates and parent”).
171. Although a SIPA proceeding is a form of Chapter 7 proceeding, it nonetheless is
a substantively different type of proceeding and, therefore, is not a candidate for consolidation with a “plain vanilla” Chapter 7 proceeding.
172. Cf. Ryan W. Johnson, The Preservation of Substantive Consolidation, Am.
Bankr. Inst. J., July–Aug. 2005, at 44, 44 & n.9 (distinguishing substantive consolidation of
Chapter 7 cases from substantive consolidation of Chapter 11 cases).
173. See Trustee’s Second Six Month Interim Report for the Period June 5, 2012
Through December 4, 2012, at 14–18, In re MF Global Inc., No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/document/
GetDocument.aspx?DocumentId=2176933 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing claims made by various MF Global entities against one another).
174. See Jason M. Breslow, MF Global Trustee Hints at Negligence Suit Against Jon
Corzine, PBS Frontline (June 4, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/mf-global-six-billion-dollar-bet/mf-global-trust
ee-hints-at-negligece-suit-against-jon-corzine/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reciting conclusions of MF Global Inc.’s trustee, including that customer funds had been
used for “margin calls on European sovereign debt positions”).
175. See id. (reporting trustee’s conclusion that “Jon Corzine and other former
executives of MF Global Holdings Ltd.” were responsible for loss of customer funds).
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Yet, in the entity-centric liquidation phase, with each entity seeking
to maximize its own estate,176 Holdings’s trustee not only filed substantive
claims against MF Global Inc., on the basis that Holdings’s funds had
been contributed to or were otherwise held by MF Global Inc.,177 but also
asserted the attorney-client privilege in response to a subpoena from MF
Global Inc.’s trustee,178 who was charged with locating the missing
customer funds,179 and challenged the validity of CFTC rules that would
entitle MF Global Inc.’s futures customers to the entity’s proprietary
assets in the event that customers’ funds could not be found and
returned.180 Additionally, Holdings’s trustee disputed the applicability of
those customer-protective rules to a brokerage firm liquidation brought
under SIPA (a statute intended to govern securities brokerage firm liquidations but not futures brokerage firm liquidations), as the MF Global
Inc. liquidation had been.181 Needless to say, the entity-based battles
meant that MF Global Inc. would face substantial challenges in retrieving
its customers’ assets.182

176. See MF Global Plan Disclosure Statement, supra note 106, at 40–48 (listing
claims made by various MF Global entities against other MF Global entities and noting
Holdings and certain U.S. subsidiaries had “filed 68 claims against [MF Global Inc.]
totaling in excess of $2.3 billion”).
177. See Objection of the Chapter 11 Trustee to the SIPA Trustee’s Motion for Entry
of an Order Approving Agreement to Cooperate with and Assign Certain Claims to Class
Action Plaintiffs in Pending Actions and to Distribute Funds Recovered to Customers at
15, In re MF Global Inc., 481 B.R. 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-15059 (MG)),
available at http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/Document/GetDocument/1787440 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (setting forth Holdings’s claims against MF Global Inc.,
which totaled approximately $2.3 billion); see also MF Global Plan Disclosure Statement,
supra note 106, at 34–35, 41 (summarizing Holdings’s and other MF Global entities’
claims against MF Global Inc.).
178. MF Global Plan Disclosure Statement, supra note 106, at 35 (“The Chapter 11
Trustee asserted attorney-client privilege . . . for some of the documents sought by the
SIPA Trustee.”). The two trustees ultimately reached an agreement involving Holdings’s
limited waiver of the privilege. See id. at 35–36.
179. See Spector & Lucchetti, SIPC Expected to Name Trustee, supra note 154
(describing MF Global Inc.’s “ultimate goal” as “maximizing value for customers”).
180. See Trustee’s Response to Briefing Regarding the Legal Principles and
Framework for Allocation and Distribution of Customer Property at 4–5, In re MF Global
Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter
Trustee’s Response to Briefing], available at http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/
Document/GetDocument/1555541 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The Chapter
11 Trustee believes a plain reading of . . . the Bankruptcy Code requires a ratable
distribution of . . . non-customer assets among [MF Global Inc.]’s general estate
creditors . . . .”).
181. See id. at 4 (“[T]he [CFTC’s] Part 190 Regulations do not apply in a SIPA
proceeding because a SIPA proceeding is not a case under chapter 7.”).
182. See Staff Report, supra note 120, at 95–96 (describing challenges facing MF
Global Inc.’s trustee in recovering U.S. customers’ funds that Holdings had transferred to
MF Global UK); Devlin Barrett & Aaron Lucchetti, Hope for MF Global Clients, Wall St. J.
(July 31, 2012, 7:43 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904444058045
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4. Entity-Based Limitations on Customer Protections. — In the squabbling
among the MF Global trustees could be discerned a second problematic
feature of the laws and rules governing futures brokers—one that is similarly the product of this Article’s standard complaint: Those laws and
rules do not anticipate that a brokerage firm may be entirely owned and
controlled by another entity. In particular, with the goal of protecting
customers,183 the CFTC rules, as noted above, specify that a firm’s own
funds may be tapped to eliminate any shortfall of customer funds that
might otherwise remain after customer assets have been marshaled.184
Because the rules do not contemplate the existence of a parent company,
however, to the extent the broker’s own assets are insufficient to eliminate a shortfall, there is no apparent basis for recourse to the parent
company’s assets.185 The parent is, after all, a separate entity.
However, it is precisely when there exists a parent company or other
complex organizational structure that recourse to the parent company’s
(or other controlling entity’s) assets becomes particularly important. In
those situations, the parent company, pursuing its own proprietary
trading or other business activities, may not have required the brokerage
subsidiary to maintain capital beyond that necessary for it to satisfy its
minimum net capital requirements under applicable CFTC and, possibly,
SEC rules. Again, one might think of the broker and any other financial
services subsidiaries under the parent company’s umbrella as assets that
the parent company may exploit to its best advantage, so long as the subsidiaries continue to satisfy their respective regulatory obligations.186 This
describes the state of affairs in the MF Global bankruptcy, and, not
surprisingly, Holdings’s trustee did not countenance the use of
Holdings’s assets for the benefit of MF Global Inc.’s brokerage
customers.187 Put another way, one of the trustee’s apparent goals was to
keep entity separateness intact—an endeavor that worked to the

77561531001893726.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting efforts by MF
Global Inc.’s trustee to recover customer funds “face[d] daunting obstacles”).
183. Unlike securities brokerage customers, futures brokerage customers, in the
event their assets are missing from their accounts at the time of insolvency, are not entitled
to compensation under SIPA or any other regulatory framework. See infra notes 193–195
and accompanying text for a discussion of the insurance provided under SIPA for
securities brokerage customers.
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1)(ii)(J) (2013) (permitting customer recourse to
“cash, securities or other property of the debtor’s estate”); see also supra note 180 and
accompanying text (noting Holdings’s trustee challenged applicability of these rules).
185. See 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(a)(1) (describing assets comprising “customer
property”).
186. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (describing how parent company may control and dominate subsidiaries’ activities).
187. See Trustee’s Response to Briefing, supra note 180, at 3–5 (claiming Holdings
and other creditors of MF Global Inc., rather than brokerage customers, were entitled to
MF Global Inc.’s assets under CFTC rules).
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detriment of those persons the CFTC’s liquidation regulations were
designed to protect.
Although there have been claims that Holdings’s trustee was overreaching, both in making claims against MF Global Inc. and in
sequestering Holdings’s assets,188 he was merely pursuing the arguments
that entity-centric laws and rules allowed, if not required, him to pursue.
If the brokerage customers are ultimately made whole, as most observers
speculate will happen,189 it will be in spite of the financial services regulatory regime, not because of it. A more workable and fair regulatory
approach would require a financial services firm’s liquidation to proceed
in the same manner as its operations were conducted—as a multipart,
cohesive enterprise, with entity boundaries fluid, rather than ossified.
There is no magic to entity boundaries in bankruptcy that did not exist
prior to the bankruptcy filing. Financial services regulation, in other
words, need not be based on corporate governance principles, which
revolve around the relationship between an entity’s owners (and possibly
creditors), on the one hand, and its managers, on the other. Accordingly, it need not turn on determinations as to where one entity ends and
another begins.
B. Stanford Financial Group
1. The Ponzi Scheme. — Like MF Global, Stanford Financial Group
(SFG)—multiple entities whose activities were seamlessly coordinated—
was a relatively well-established financial services firm,190 whose customers
188. See, e.g., Ben Protess & Azam Ahmed, An MF Global Trustee Defends His
Inquiry, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Apr. 24, 2012, 8:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/04/24/an-mf-global-trustee-defends-his-inquiry/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (observing Louis Freeh, Holdings’s trustee, had been criticized for his “handling
of the case” and “prevent[ing] the brokerage [subsidiary’s] customers . . . from recovering
their money”).
189. See, e.g., Trustee’s Motion to (I) Approve the Trustee’s Allocation of Property
and (II) Approve the Terms of an Advance of General Estate Property for the Purpose of
Making a Final 100% Distribution to Former Commodity Futures Customers of MF Global
Inc. at 1, In re MF Global Inc., No. 11-2790 (MG) SIPA (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 2,
2013),
available
at
http://dm.epiq11.com/MFG/document/GetDocument.aspx?
DocumentId=2423832 (asking court to approve distribution to MF Global brokerage
customers of estate assets equal to remaining unpaid portion of prebankruptcy account
balances); Nick Brown, Bankruptcy Judge Approves MF Global’s Liquidation Plan, Reuters
(Apr. 5, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/05/us-mfglobalbankruptcy-court-idUSBRE9340N420130405 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing
belief of Holdings’s trustee that “customers in this case will be made whole” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
190. See Kristen Hays & Mary Flood, Billionaire Downplays Scrutiny of Stanford
Financial, Hous. Chron. (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.chron.com/business/article/
Billionaire-downplays-scrutiny-of-Stanford-1742027.php (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reciting company’s claim it had “more than $50 billion in assets under
management” and “more than 50 offices in North America, Latin America, the Caribbean
and Europe”).

2013]

ESCAPING ENTITY-CENTRISM

2081

likely took comfort in owner Allen Stanford’s “great reputation.”191 Yet,
by the time proceedings commenced to liquidate the Stanford entities,
those customers had learned that they had been the victims of Mr.
Stanford’s mammoth Ponzi scheme, which involved over $7 billion.192
Since then, their efforts have centered on attaining some measure of
reimbursement, whether from SFG’s estate or from the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a not-for-profit corporation
that, pursuant to SIPA’s mandate, operates an insurance scheme for
securities brokerage customers.193 Specifically, SIPC compensates customers in the event of a securities broker’s insolvency at a time when
customer accounts do not contain the funds or securities reflected on the
customers’ brokerage statements.194 A securities broker that accepts
customer deposits must be a SIPC member and, as such, must contribute
to SIPC’s insurance fund.195
The basic facts of the SFG Ponzi scheme are relatively
straightforward. Mr. Stanford owned and controlled a multi-entity financial services enterprise. In particular, the enterprise comprised a U.S.based entity—Stanford Group Company (SGC)—that was registered
with, and regulated by, the SEC as a broker-dealer.196 SGC was also a
member of SIPC, even though it did not accept customer deposits and
thus was under no obligation to become a member.197 A second component of the enterprise was Stanford International Bank, Ltd. (SIBL),
an Antiguan bank that, as a non-U.S. entity, was not subject to SIPA and,

191. Ken Fisher with Lara Hoffmans, How to Smell a Rat: The Five Signs of Financial
Fraud 94 (2009) (describing public perception of Allen Stanford while predicting he
would end up in prison).
192. See Clifford Krauss et al., Texas Firm Accused of $8 Billion Fraud, N.Y. Times
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/business/18stanford.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting Allen Stanford’s arrest for “massive ongoing
fraud” involving potentially $8 billion in assets).
193. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor
Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1071, 1096 (1998) (“To the extent that the fund of customer property may be insufficient
to satisfy all customer claims for net equity, the SIPC fund will cover the shortfall.”).
194. See Securities Investor Protection Corporation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/sipc.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited
Sept. 29, 2013) (“If your brokerage firm goes out of business and is a member of [SIPC],
then your cash and securities . . . may be protected up to $500,000 . . . .” ). That might be
the case when, for example, the firm has loaned out the securities for the purpose of
allowing other brokerage customers to effect “short” sales, much as a commercial bank
uses banking customers’ cash deposits to make cash loans to other banking customers.
195. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ccc(a)(2), 78ddd(c) (2012) (setting forth SIPC’s membership and assessment requirements).
196. See SEC v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing SGC as “now-defunct broker-dealer”).
197. See id. at 5, 7–8 (noting SGC was SIPC member and customers deposited funds
with Stanford International Bank, Ltd. rather than with SGC).
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therefore, not a SIPC member.198 SGC was a marketer, formally called an
“introducing broker,” that promoted SIBL and arranged the relationship
between SIBL and its customers.199 SGC’s performance of that role was
essential for SIBL’s activities in the enterprise.200 For its part, SIBL was
the entity that accepted customer deposits.201 In return, SIBL issued to
depositors certificates of deposit (CDs) that, typical of CDs generally, had
fixed terms and were to generate earnings based on specific rates of
interest.202 Moreover, and also typical of CDs generally, SIBL should have
met its obligations to pay that interest through investing deposits legitimately and conservatively.203
In fact, through SIBL, Mr. Stanford expropriated customers’ funds
for his own personal purposes, satisfying obligations to pay customers
who redeemed their CDs using new customers’ deposits.204 Regulators’
revelation of the fraud, in February 2009, was followed by further
revelations of regulatory failings that had kept the scheme operating
longer than it might have otherwise.205 Among other things, the episode
embodied a veritable study in the problems created by the “revolving
door” between regulators and the regulated.206 But for the close relation198. See id. at 5, 7 (observing SIBL was not SIPC member and reciting disclosure
stating SIBL was not subject to any jurisdiction’s “securities insurance laws”).
199. See id. at 2 (“The [SIBL] CDs were marketed by [SGC].”).
200. See id. at 3 (noting those who bought SIBL-issued CDs were SGC’s customers).
201. See id. at 2, 7 (observing “CD investors” deposited funds with SIBL).
202. See James Quinn, FBI Believes Stanford Was Running Massive Ponzi Scheme,
Telegraph (London) (Feb. 20, 2009, 8:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
financetopics/sir-allen-stanford/4737012/FBI-believes-Stanford-was-running-massive-Ponzi
-scheme.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing CDs as “essentially
medium-term savings products usually offering a fixed rate of interest”); cf. Sec. Investor
Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (noting SGC’s marketing materials included caution that
there was “no guarantee investors [would] receive interest distributions or the return of
their principal” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
203. See Clifford Krauss, Indicted, Texas Financier Surrenders, N.Y. Times (June 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/business/19stanford.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting, according to SEC, Stanford’s CDs “had been surreptitiously
invested in real estate, other speculative investments and into Mr. Stanford’s own
operations even as his clients were told their funds had been invested in highly liquid and
conservative assets”).
204. See SEC, Analysis of Securities Investor Protection Act Coverage for Stanford
Group Company 5 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2011/stanfordsipa-analysis.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining Stanford used “CD sale
proceeds” to fund redemptions “because sufficient assets, reserves and investments were
not available”).
205. See generally Office of Inspector Gen., SEC, Investigation of the SEC’s Response
to Concerns Regarding Robert Allen Stanford’s Alleged Ponzi Scheme (2010) [hereinafter
SEC Investigation Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig526.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing regulators’ longstanding
suspicions of Stanford’s business and SEC’s failures, over decade, to bring enforcement
action against him or his firm).
206. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting how regulators’ relationships
with regulatory subjects challenge enforcement efforts); see also Murray Waas, Insight:
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ship between Mr. Stanford and certain members of the SEC staff, the
SEC may have more deeply scrutinized Mr. Stanford’s activities and more
doggedly pursued customer and third-party questions and complaints
about those activities.207
2. The Pursuit of SIPC Compensation. — Regardless of how or whether
regulators ignored or underperformed their obligations while the
Stanford fraud was underway, the fact remained that SFG’s customers
had lost the principal value of their deposits, as well as any expectation of
interest on those funds.208 The question for them, particularly given the
backdrop of a regulatory regime based on the goal of protecting
investors, became whether they were entitled to any compensation for
their losses.209 The only realistic candidate for providing that compensation was SIPC, pursuant to its obligations under SIPA.210 The SEC
endorsed that prospect, a crucial condition given that, under SIPA,
private parties have no right to seek SIPC compensation on their own.211
Accordingly, acting pursuant to its authorization under SIPA, the SEC
sought to compel SIPC to provide SIPA-based compensation to
Stanford’s victims, on the grounds that SGC—again, the U.S.-based
introducing broker—had been an SEC-registered broker-dealer and a
SIPC member.212

How Allen Stanford Kept the SEC at Bay, Reuters (Jan. 26, 2012, 5:46 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-sec-stanford-idUSTRE80P22R20120126
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing how Stanford “paid at least eight former
senior U.S. and foreign regulators and law-enforcement officials for legal advice or
investigative services”).
207. See Waas, supra note 206 (describing how Stanford’s relationship with exregulators and officials may have “ke[pt] authorities at bay for so long”). But see SEC
Investigation Report, supra note 205, at 149 (noting SEC’s Office of Inspector General
“did not find that [the SEC’s] reluctance . . . to investigate or recommend an action
against Stanford was related to any improper professional, social or financial relationship
on the part of any former or current SEC employee”).
208. See Peter J. Henning, Compensating Stanford’s Investors, N.Y. Times: Dealbook
(June 20, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/compensatingstanfords-investors/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting SIBL’s customers
bought “$7.2 billion in allegedly bogus certificates of deposit”).
209. See id. (observing “SIPC provides a measure of protection for customers when a
broker becomes insolvent” but “authorities are still figuring out whether investors can get
compensated for some of their losses”).
210. Cf. id. (noting SEC was pushing for Stanford’s customers to be “treated as
brokerage customers by [SIPC]” because, if they were so treated, they “could get at least
some of their money back”).
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a) (2012) (setting forth who may seek SIPC protection for
broker-dealer’s customers); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424–25
(1975) (holding customers of broker-dealer do not have implied right of action under
SIPA to compel SIPC to exercise its authority to compensate them for losses).
212. See SEC v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting
SGC was SEC-registered broker-dealer and SIPC member). More precisely, the SEC sought
to compel SIPC to seek a protective decree from the U.S. District Court for the Northern
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SIPC declined to comply with the SEC’s request to commence a
SIPA liquidation proceeding, the first time in SIPA’s forty-two-year history that it had done so.213 SIPC’s reasoning, while upsetting to the
Stanford victims, was simply based on the statute.214 According to SIPC,
the victims were not entitled to compensation under SIPA because the
statute does not cover brokerage customers in their particular circumstances.215 That was in part because, according to SIPC, the sole SIPC
member in the Stanford group of entities, SGC, did not accept deposits
from, or otherwise perform a custodial function for, Stanford customers.216 Customers thus did not suffer losses at the hands of the entity
whose actions would have given rise to SIPC insurance coverage.
SIPC’s second argument, also surely correct, was that Stanford’s
victims had not suffered the sort of harms that SIPA exists to remedy: a
broker-dealer’s loss of cash or securities that a brokerage customer
placed with it.217 Specifically, it was not the case that the securities the
victims had bought through their relationship with Stanford—the CDs—
were missing from the victims’ accounts with Stanford, since the CDs
themselves were accounted for.218 To be sure, they were worthless, but
SIPC’s point was that the victims had gotten, and still possessed, what
District of Texas, which would have had jurisdiction over any liquidation proceeding conducted under SIPA. See id.
213. See id. (“[T]his proceeding is the first instance since SIPA was enacted . . . in
which the SEC has sought . . . to compel the SIPC to file an application for a protective
decree.”).
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(2)(A)–(C) (noting “term ‘customer’ of a debtor means any
person . . . who has a claim on account of securities received, acquired, or held by the
debtor” but does not include person whose claim “arises out of transactions with a foreign
subsidiary of a member of SIPC”); see also Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 7–11
(describing SIPC’s SIPA-based arguments); Letter from Stephen P. Harbeck, President,
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., to Ralph S. Janvey, Receiver, Stanford Fin. Grp. (Aug. 14, 2009)
[hereinafter Harbeck Letter], available at http://www.stanfordfinancialreceivership.com/
documents/SIPC_Letter.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing why, given
facts of Stanford fraud, “there is no basis for SIPC to initiate a proceeding under SIPA”).
215. See Securities Investor Protection Corporation’s Brief in Opposition to SEC’s
Application for Order Under 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) at 14–21, Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (No. 11-mc-678 (RLW)) [hereinafter SIPC Brief] (explaining why, in SIPC’s
view, SEC had not adequately shown that Stanford’s customers were entitled to SIPC
compensation); Harbeck Letter, supra note 214, at 3 (describing why SIPC compensation
is not available, under SIPA, for SIBL’s customers).
216. See SIPC Brief, supra note 215, at 16–18 (explaining Stanford customers placed
their funds with SIBL, not SGC, and bought SIBL CDs).
217. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (“[T]he SIPA statute ‘attempts to
protect customer interests in securities and cash left with broker-dealers . . . .’” (emphasis
added by Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.) (quoting Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities
Regulation 3290 (3d ed. 2003))).
218. See SIPC Brief, supra note 215, at 18 (“[U]pon sending their funds to SIBL,
investors or their designees received their actual CDs in return.”); Harbeck Letter, supra
note 214, at 3 (noting, although “SIPC protects the custody function performed by SIPC
member firms for customers,” because SIBL issued CDs to its customers, “those individuals
[still] have their securities” (emphasis omitted)).
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they had paid for.219 Accordingly, Stanford’s victims were not suffering
the harm, and therefore were not in need of the protections, that SIPA
contemplates. If those arguments seem to be based on formalism and
blind to the realities of the Stanford company structure, that is a
necessary consequence of SIPA’s formalistic emphasis on entity boundaries and entity independence.
3. Regulatory Disregard of Entity Relationships. — After the revelation of
the Stanford fraud, the entity-centrism of applicable laws and rules
further disadvantaged those whom they were created to protect. To
begin with SIPC’s first argument, SIPA covers only brokerage
“customers”—those who have “entrusted cash or securities to a brokerdealer who becomes insolvent.”220 No entrustment means no SIPC coverage. In theory, at least, the basis for that distinction is unassailable. If an
investor has not placed any funds or securities with the insolvent brokerdealer, she has not lost anything as a result of the insolvency. Of course,
myriad factors might complicate that picture. For example, is an investor
a customer of a SIPC member if she entrusts funds or securities to a third
party who then sends the assets to a SIPC member to hold in custody?221
Is the investor covered if she deposits funds with a SIPC member who
then sends the funds to the ultimate custodian,222 who is not a SIPC
member?223 One particular factor complicates the Stanford matter: The
firm with which customers placed their funds—SIBL, which, again, was
not a SIPC member—was owned and controlled by the person who
owned and controlled the firm that brought customers into the Stanford

219. See SIPC Brief, supra note 215, at 18–19 (contending CDs were either delivered
to customer or held by IRA custodian).
220. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Pepperdine Univ. (In re Brentwood Sec., Inc.), 925
F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1991).
221. Although more information is needed to answer this question, based on the
SEC’s interpretation of “customer” under SIPA, that answer is arguably “yes,” regardless of
whether the customer knew that the third party would transfer the assets, so long as the
arrangement satisfies certain conditions. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 10
(reciting SEC’s interpretation of “customer,” whereby investor is not “customer” of introducing broker with whom investor placed assets, to extent introducing broker “promptly
forwards all funds and securities to the clearing broker [who coordinates the investor’s
trading activities],” and clearing broker, among other requirements, acknowledges
investor’s customer status).
222. As used in the financial services context, a custodian is a firm—often a brokerdealer or a bank—that is responsible for holding and safeguarding brokerage customers’
assets. See Custodian, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/custodian.asp
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 17, 2013) (defining “custodian” as
“financial institution that holds customers’ securities for safekeeping so as to minimize the
risk of their theft or loss,” which may also “offer a variety of other services including
account administration, transaction settlements, collection of dividends and interest
payments, tax support and foreign exchange”).
223. Arguably, the answer to this question is “no,” again based on the SEC’s
interpretation of “customer.” See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (reciting
SEC’s interpretation of “customer” for purposes of SIPA).
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scheme—SGC, which, again, was a SIPC member.224 SIPA simply does not
speak to that fact pattern. SIPA and the legislative history behind it speak
of broker-dealers in the singular and do not appear expressly to contemplate, or consider the implications of, covered firms’ status as components of larger, multi-entity enterprises.225
That focus on broker-dealers as stand-alone, independently operated
businesses is also evident in the notion that SIPC membership should be
available voluntarily even to those firms that do not pursue the sorts of
activities deemed to give rise to the risks about which Congress was concerned—that is, those firms that “neither hold free credit balances for
customers nor hold securities for them which may be ‘hypothecated.’”226
The legislative history approvingly suggests that brokerage firms that do
not place their customers’ cash or securities at risk may nonetheless
desire to become SIPC members on the basis that doing so might be
good for business.227 Some firms, it notes, may wish “to take advantage of
SIPC membership as a general asset in the conduct of their business.”228
The notion behind the prospect of, say, an introducing (noncustodial)
broker becoming a member is that everyone wins. Voluntary members
may get a marginal reputational boost, while SIPC coffers get a marginal
boost in the annual assessments it levies against member firms. From the
perspective of achieving regulatory goals, moreover, it is simply a circumstance of no harm, no foul. Under this reasoning, since broker-dealers
are stand-alone entities, voluntary SIPC membership, though doing nothing to further SIPA’s purpose, also does nothing to harm brokerage
customers.
However, once we introduce the notion that any given broker-dealer
may not, in fact, operate separately from other broker-dealers or other
custodians and, indeed, may be part of a larger, multi-entity financial
services enterprise, voluntary membership is no longer akin to a tree fall-

224. See id. at 2 (describing Stanford Financial Group entities and their relationships
to one another).
225. In light of the House and the Senate committees’ respective reports on the
proposed statute at the time of its enactment, that is not surprising. The goal of the legislation, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce pointed out, is to
“provide protection to investors if the broker-dealer with whom they are doing business
encounters financial troubles.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1613, at 1 (1970).
226. S. Rep. No. 91-1218, at 4 (1970). In other words, in enacting SIPA, Congress was
concerned only about those broker-dealers who held customer assets and to whom
customers might pledge those assets in the commonplace event that the customers
borrowed cash or securities from the broker-dealers in furtherance of the customers’
trading or investment activities. By contrast, Congress was not concerned about those
broker-dealers who did not hold customer assets (and who, therefore, could not be the
pledgees of customer assets) because Congress perceived that those broker-dealers would
not be in a position to lose the assets.
227. See id. (noting for broker-dealers that do not hold customer cash or securities
“membership in SIPC is voluntary”).
228. Id.
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ing in the deserted woods. It is the Stanford Financial Group. Mr.
Stanford controlled two entities.229 One did not accept customer funds
but was a SIPC member (and advertised itself as such), while the other
entity accepted customer deposits but, located offshore, was not a SIPC
member or otherwise subject to a customer funds insurance regime.230
Regardless of whether Stanford’s victims had taken (unwarranted) comfort in SGC’s status as a SIPC member at the time they bought their CDs
or whether Mr. Stanford and his colleagues intended to (mis)lead them
to think they would have the benefit of SIPC coverage in the event of
SFG’s insolvency, SIPC’s entity-centrism meant that the statute did not
address the commonplace circumstance of commonly controlled financial services entities, let alone the prospect of an enterprise’s piecemeal
use of SIPC membership as window dressing.
4. Entities as Investment Instruments. — Recall that a second component of SIPC’s argument that Stanford’s victims did not fall within SIPA’s
purview was the notion that nothing had happened to customers’ holdings. The funds customers placed with SFG did, in fact, go to buying CDs,
and those CDs—the certificates themselves—still exist and, in one way or
another, are accounted for.231 That circumstance contrasts with the
scenario SIPA contemplates, in which assets are not available for the
customer to withdraw as a result of a brokerage firm’s insolvency at a
time when a customer’s assets are “in use” by the firm, leaving the firm
obligated to the customer to that extent.232 Entity-centrism can be readily
seen in this aspect of the statute as well, in the form of a preference for
nonpooled customer accounts.233
In any brokerage arrangement, customer funds should be properly
deployed, meaning that they should be suitably invested or otherwise
used so as to produce a return for customers. Beyond that defining concept, brokerage arrangements differ. In one common arrangement, the

229. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 2 (noting Stanford “owned or
controlled” Stanford Financial Group entities).
230. See id. at 2, 7–8 (describing functions of SGC and SIBL within Stanford
Financial Group and noting whether each had been SIPC member).
231. See SIPC Brief, supra note 215, at 18–19 (arguing Stanford’s customers had
custody of their CDs and SGC did not have custody of any customer funds or securities).
232. See id. at 10–12 (observing “SIPA protects only the cash or securities that a
brokerage is holding for a person when it fails” but does not insure value of any such
securities (emphasis omitted)).
233. In other words, the Stanford CD arrangement may be viewed as a type of pooled
investment arrangement. Its structure, moreover, had substantial similarities to that of
other pooled investment entities. In both cases, an investor effectively buys a security that
she thereafter holds until redemption. The funds the investor used to buy the security are
pooled with the funds that other investors placed in the arrangement, which are then
deployed for various investment activities. Depending on the success of those activities, the
value of the security held by the investor will increase or decrease. Regardless, under SIPA,
the investor cannot be said to have cash or securities “on deposit” in the fund or with the
fund’s operator.
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customer grants the brokerage firm discretionary authority to trade and
invest funds or other assets that the customer places in a brokerage
account under her name.234 In those circumstances, the customer has
legal title to those assets and to each security or other instrument for
which those assets are used.235 If the broker misappropriates the
customer’s assets prior to, or in connection with, becoming insolvent, the
customer, in addition to having fraud-based claims, is also protected
under SIPA.236 By contrast, where the customer has bought a CD from
the brokerage firm, she has bought something resembling an interest in
a pooled investment entity—a fund, in other words.237 Regardless of what
the broker, as the fund’s manager, might do with the securities or other
instruments the fund has bought, the customer still formally holds her
shares or interests in the fund. Therefore, in the event the broker
absconds with the fund’s assets or uses the fund to carry out a pyramid
scheme, the customer has no protection under SIPA. Nothing is missing,
after all.238
This suggests that the structure of an investor’s discretionary
arrangement with her brokerage firm is critically important. If the
investor bought an interest in a fund sponsored by the firm, in the event
of a Stanford-like fraud she likely would end up with nothing. However, if
the investor instead placed her assets in a separately managed brokerage
account, she would likely be compensated with SIPA insurance. Arguably,
this is one difference between Stanford’s victims and Madoff’s—the
latter, but not the former, were deemed entitled to at least some com234. See Accounts—Opening a Brokerage Account, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/openaccount.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last modified Mar. 26, 2008) (explaining investor opening brokerage account may choose
to give broker discretionary authority, permitting broker to invest investor’s account assets
“without consulting [the investor] about the price, the type of security, the amount, and
when to buy or sell”).
235. See SIPC Brief, supra note 215, at 11 (“SIPA protects only the cash or securities
that a brokerage is holding for a person when it fails . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
236. See id. at 10–13 (summarizing what SIPA covers and what it does not cover).
That result is perhaps surprising, given that SIPA is expressly not a statute designed for
antifraud purposes. See id. at 12 (“SIPA does not protect against . . . fraud . . . .”); see also
S. Rep. No. 91-1218, at 2–3 (1970) (observing although Securities Act of 1933 and
Exchange Act require disclosure and protect investors against “fraudulent, manipulative,
or deceptive selling schemes[,] . . . neither statute prevents the investor from losing his
entire investment if his broker fails because of operational and, ultimately, financial
difficulties”).
237. In both the Stanford context and the typical hedge fund context, for example,
investors receive securities in exchange for their contributions of capital. Cf. Office of
Investor Educ., SEC, Investor Bulletin: Hedge Funds (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing common limitations imposed by hedge funds on investors’ ability to
redeem shares).
238. However, the customer has fraud-based claims under federal, and probably
state, securities laws. See SIPC Brief, supra note 215, at 12 (“SIPA does not guarantee the
value of investments even if they fail . . . .”).
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pensation from SIPC.239 It is also a difference between entity-centrism
and a more complete understanding of how financial services firms are
structured and function. As soon as a broker-dealer establishes a “pool”—
an entity—for investing customer assets, regulation refuses to look
beyond the boundaries of that entity and the fact of the continuing existence of the securities that the pool issued, however worthless they may
have become.240
III. BASES OF REGULATION’S DISSONANCE
If the entity-centrism of financial services regulation appears inconsistent, in many respects, with the operations of financial services firms, it
is worth considering why it is so prevalent. Why are entities, rather than
subentity or multi-entity units, the subject of financial services regulation?241 What is the basis of the doctrine that investment advisers owe
their regulatory duties to an entity that they created and control?242 Why
do financial services regulations that apply to insolvencies cause a multientity enterprise that in life functioned as a unitary firm to break into
warring units in death?243 And why does the brokerage customer insurance regime not encompass customers of all entities formed, owned, and
controlled by the same person?244 What, in other words, has led to the
entity-centrism of financial services regulation?
Only by better understanding the origins of this problematic aspect
of financial services regulation can we appreciate that it is by no means
indispensable and, more importantly, equip ourselves to move beyond it
and to think of alternative and more effective regulatory approaches.

239. See John Wasik, Is SIPC Doing Enough for Scam Victims?, Forbes (Sept. 20,
2012, 12:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/09/20/is-sipc-doingenough-for-scam-victims/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting SIPC’s
announcement that “nearly $2.5 billion in checks were mailed to victims in the liquidation
of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities LLC”).
240. One might wonder whether only more sophisticated investors might choose to
obtain investment services through a pooled, or fund, structure rather than through a
separately held discretionary brokerage account and whether, if so, there might be less
need for regulatory protections in the context of the pooled structure. If there is a greater
tendency for sophisticated investors to choose one mode of investing over the other,
arguably that tendency would be in the direction of discretionary account arrangements.
Discretionary account arrangements permit the broker or adviser to tailor investment
decisions to the investor’s particular needs, whereas pooled structures work well for
investors whose investment assets might not reach the threshold necessary for a discretionary account arrangement.
241. See supra notes 43–56 and accompanying text (observing entity, rather than
some other unit, is typically regulatory subject).
242. See supra Part I.B.2 (noting investment adviser owes regulatory obligations to
funds it has created, rather than to funds’ investors).
243. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing MF Global bankruptcy).
244. See supra Part II.B.3 (evaluating whether customers of non-SIPC entity under
common ownership with SIPC member were owed SIPC compensation).
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Accordingly, this Part suggests that two processes, largely unwitting ones,
have played a role—and will continue to play a role—in bringing about
the pervasive entity-centrism of financial services regulation. First, as Part
III.A describes, early entity-based approaches to formulating securities
regulation may have dictated the formulation of regulation in other
financial services contexts, a tendency this Article calls “regulatory
inertia.” Second, as Part III.B discusses, regardless of what processes
influenced the formulation of entity-centric regulation, its most harmful
manifestations have occurred when essentially unused or untested laws
and rules have been dusted off and put into action to address new sets of
facts but have been incapable of doing so, a tendency this Article calls
“regulatory atrophy.”
A. Regulatory Inertia
One lens through which to evaluate the bases of entity-centrism is
the notion, first developed in Part I, that the entity focus of financial services regulation has some affinities with the norms and principles of
corporate governance.245 The body of laws, rules, norms, and practices by
which corporations are governed concern themselves, by definition, with
the entity.246 That observation, of course, does not address the reasons
why financial services regulation would have followed suit. The connection, however, can be discerned by returning to the first principles of
financial services regulation, beginning with its commonsensical definition: Financial services regulation is the regulation of firms in their
capacities as providers of specific types of financial services. As discussed
in Part I, the term “financial services,” for its part, encompasses such
activities as providing securities and futures brokerage services, financial
and investment advisory services, and mutual fund or other pooled
investment services.247 Financial services regulation, then, is a similarly
broad label.248
It did not start out that way, however, which becomes evident when
one considers where some of the earliest U.S. financial services regulation might be found—namely, within the suite of securities statutes
245. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (observing corporate governance
norms are entity-focused).
246. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing how corporate
governance doctrine is both entity-focused and centered on entity’s internal relationships).
247. See supra notes 43–55 and accompanying text (describing various services
encompassed by “financial services” label).
248. See supra Part I.B (describing various types of financial services regulation and
their entity-centric deficiencies); see also Lawrence J. White, Technological Change,
Financial Innovation, and Financial Regulation: The Challenges for Public Policy 14–20
(Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper No. 97-33, 1997), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/97/white.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (discussing structure and content of various types of financial services regulation).
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enacted in the aftermath of the 1920s stock market crash. One of those
statutes is the Advisers Act,249 which, along with the SEC’s rules under
that statute,250 governs advisers that provide investment advice as to
securities; another is the Investment Company Act,251 which, with the
associated SEC rules,252 sets forth the regulatory framework covering public “investment companies,” such as mutual funds. Finally, broker-dealers,
including investment banks, underwriters, and those creatures the media
refers to as “trading firms,” are regulated through various provisions of
the Exchange Act253 and associated SEC rules.254 Insofar as financial
services regulation pertains to investment advisers, publicly offered
investment entities, and securities brokerage firms, it is a form of securities
regulation.255 Accordingly, we might say that financial services regulation
originated as a form of securities regulation.
Not all components of the early securities statutes can be considered
financial services regulation, however. In particular, perhaps the most
fundamental of the Depression-era securities statutes is the Securities Act
of 1933 (“Securities Act”),256 which, along with the SEC’s rules under
it,257 regulates firms’ issuance of securities to investors, whether through
public or private offerings. In addition, although the Exchange Act contains the regulatory framework governing broker-dealers, it encompasses
considerably more than that.258 Specifically, it primarily governs securities
exchanges and the trading of public companies’ securities in the secondary markets.259
There are, then, critical distinctions among the types of activities the
securities laws regulate. The financial services regulatory provisions contained in and under the securities laws—encompassing, again, regulation
of broker-dealers, investment advisers, and investment companies—are
forms of professional services regulation. That is, they govern and
249. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2012).
250. 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.0-2 to 275.222-2 (2013).
251. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64.
252. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.0-1 to 270.60a-1.
253. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-1 to 78o-3.
254. 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.
255. That is, securities regulation pertains to the issuance of or investment in securities and is set forth in the securities laws and the rules adopted by the SEC pursuant to the
authority that the securities laws grant to that agency. The securities statutes, which
include the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, the Advisers Act, the Investment
Company Act, and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, combined with the SEC’s rules under
those statutes, contain the laws and rules governing broker-dealers, investment advisers,
and mutual funds.
256. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa.
257. 17 C.F.R. pt. 230.
258. See Larry D. Soderquist & Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Law 185–92 (4th ed.
2011) (summarizing Exchange Act’s regulatory purview).
259. See id. (summarizing Exchange Act’s regulation of secondary securities
markets).
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supplement the relationships between, on the one hand, those who provide financial services and, on the other hand, those persons’ “clients”
and/or “customers” (with the applicable term depending on the
particular financial services context).260 By contrast, laws and rules
governing securities offerings and trading exist only to structure the
relationships among constituencies of a business association—namely,
the parties that manage the business and those that own it. In other
words, this latter form of securities regulation exists to further and
support corporate governance norms by supplying mandatory requirements and procedures for aspects of the firm’s (a stand-alone entity’s)
constitution and the relationship among its key components.261 It does
so, moreover, in the name of promoting market integrity and protecting
those who could and do supply capital to business enterprises—or, more
accurately, to particular entities that conduct business activities—or who
otherwise put their capital at risk in the securities markets.262
Put another way, securities regulation of the second sort is all about
the entity. Conversely, it is also plausible to say that, without the entity,
there is no securities regulation. To be sure, the entity’s central position
is especially evident in the Securities Act, focusing as it does—and as it
must to achieve its goals—on issuers’ (entities’) obligations vis-à-vis
shareholders, even though its regulation nominally pertains to
“distributions of securities.”263 The Exchange Act, however, also
necessarily has an entity focus, notwithstanding its core concern with the
secondary markets. That suggestion arises from the circumstance that
secondary market regulation is concerned with who, at any given time,
owns shares of a particular entity and how those persons came to acquire
that status.264 That is, part of what secondary market regulation requires
is transparency regarding large stakeholder and insider holdings, as well

260. See generally Carolyn Cox & Susan Foster, Bureau of Econ., FTC, The Costs and
Benefits of Occupational Regulation 2–20 (1990), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
consumerbehavior/docs/reports/CoxFoster90.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing regulation of professionals in United States and, in particular, its rationale,
costs, and benefits).
261. See Smith & Williams, supra note 14, at 175 (noting securities regulation is
“important overlay” for state corporation statutes and provides “mechanism of
accountability within the corporation”).
262. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last modified June 10,
2013) (describing U.S. securities regulatory framework and noting SEC’s “mission” is “to
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation”).
263. Thomas Lee Hazen, Federal Securities Law 27 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d ed.
2011).
264. See id. at 100–05, 110–23 (summarizing Exchange Act’s regulatory coverage).
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as strictures against fraudulent and misleading statements or conduct by
those who are privy to confidential information about the issuer.265
The distinctions between the types of work the securities laws
perform lead to the following state of affairs: Ensconced within a set of
statutes that is “all about the entity” are provisions pertaining to those
financial services providers who facilitate securities trades and those who
provide advice on securities investments. Perhaps it should come as little
surprise, then, that the financial services regulation contained in the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act and their compatriots (the Advisers
Act and the Investment Company Act) gives a central role to the entity.
In other words, it was natural, if not inevitable, for those regulatory
provisions similarly to use the self-contained entity as the core around
which specific obligations and sanctions revolve. This tendency may be
discerned, for example, in the doctrine that deems a hedge fund or
other private fund (and not its investors) the client of the fund’s
investment adviser266 and in the mutual fund regulatory regime, which
aims regulation at the fund rather than its investment adviser, even
though the former is but an instrument for the latter’s providing its
services.267
It is the ostensible “inevitability”—or inertia—in the production of
regulation that paves the way to regulation’s continued elevation and
reification of entity boundaries in not only the entity’s operations but
also its winding up, even though, from a functional perspective, entity
boundaries may be next to meaningless. Yet there is an important distinction between the traditional function of securities regulation (the
regulation of the issuance and resale of securities) and services that
merely involve, facilitate, or relate to that function. Financial services
regulation effectively supplements private ordering, specifying aspects of
the relationship between financial services providers and their customers
and clients.268 It does so on the basis of lawmakers’ and regulators’ determinations that private ordering—the functioning of the market—will
systematically fail to protect market participants or create unduly and

265. See id. (describing provisions of Exchange Act governing tender offers and
takeover bids and prohibiting fraudulent and manipulative conduct).
266. See supra notes 72–82 and accompanying text (describing doctrine and its
potentially adverse implications for investor protection). If the traditional client was the
thing at which the adviser directed its advice, the argument goes, then that approach
should continue to apply when the clients of yore have pooled their assets in an entity.
The entity now receives the advice, so the entity should now be the “client,” never mind
that the adviser created and controls the entity and that its purpose is simply to facilitate
the adviser’s management of numerous (would-be) clients’ assets. Supra notes 71–82 and
accompanying text.
267. See supra Part I.B.2 (summarizing regulatory focus of mutual fund regulation
and advisers’ use of mutual funds to provide investment services).
268. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text (noting purpose of financial
services regulation is to protect those who use financial services).
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unproductively large transaction costs.269 Much like securities regulation
as traditionally understood, then, its purpose is to protect investors (that
is, clients and customers) and to promote market integrity.270 However,
there is no need to base its content on the entity or on entity-focused
corporate governance norms. Unlike corporate codes, corporate governance norms, or even bread-and-butter securities regulation,271 financial
services regulation does not perform a constitutive role within entities,
and its efficacy does not depend on the existence of entities, whether of
the corporate kind or otherwise.
B. Regulatory Atrophy
That the U.S. securities laws lump securities regulation centering on
corporate governance concerns with that centering on financial services
that involve securities likely has been only one factor affecting the development and evolution of financial services regulation. After all, financial
services regulation encompasses more, and less, than securities regulation, in that not all financial services regulation falls under the securities
regulation umbrella.272 Moreover, whatever might explain the origins of
regulatory entity-centrism, policymakers long ago recognized the growth
and emerging dominance of multi-entity financial services enterprises.273
Accordingly, there has to be more to the story of entity-centrism.
One possibly glaring consideration in that regard is the rather
mundane circumstance that laws and rules are prone to become obsolete

269. See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. Pa. J.
Int’l Econ. L. 33, 53 (1996) (asserting regulation is appropriate only to extent it minimizes
combined cost of “(i) deadweight loss due to [the market’s] failure to provide the optimal
mix of [particular goods at issue], and (ii) transaction costs in arriving at the final
allocation”).
270. See, e.g., Lloyd’s Market Supervision (Formerly Lloyd’s Regulatory
Requirements) Change in Syllabus and Study Book for October 2003 Examination
Session, Lloyd’s Market Bull. (July 25, 2003), available at http://www.lloyds.com/~/
media/Files/The%20Market/Communications/Market%20Bulletins/Market%20bulletin
s%20pre%2005%202010/2003/Y3102.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The
origins and purpose of financial services regulation [are] consumer protection . . . and
maintaining confidence in the financial system.”).
271. This term refers to foundational securities regulation: the regulation of the
issuance of securities under the Securities Act and the regulation of the resale of securities
under the Exchange Act. See supra notes 256–259 and accompanying text (describing
core functions of Securities Act and Exchange Act).
272. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text (listing types of financial services
regulation that are not components of securities regulation).
273. Indeed, in the banking context, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 is, as its
name implies, predicated on the longstanding circumstance that banks are typically subsidiaries in multi-entity enterprises. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2012) (defining “bank
holding company” as “any company which has control over any bank or over any company
that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of [the Bank Holding Company
Act]”).
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over time.274 Although grounding financial services laws and rules in
corporate governance norms may have been appropriate at the time the
statutes and codes were enacted or adopted, financial services firms’
structures have changed over time to the point that what once worked
has become ineffective, if not counterproductive. For example, the
expansion and maturation of the mutual fund industry in the past eighty
years has rendered nigh archaic the securities statute that governs it275—
and, in particular, its entity-focused framework relying on governance
and oversight by fund boards of directors.276
Nevertheless, recent events suggest that the tale of entity-centrism is
more complex than the tale of regulation falling behind in the march of
time and human creativity. The now-defunct global brokerage firm,
Lehman Brothers, exemplifies this point. When that firm went bankrupt
in the throes of the financial crisis, some clients of its U.S. brokerage
subsidiary, to their unwelcome surprise, were disadvantaged by certain
provisions of U.K. securities regulation governing the protection of
customer funds.277 Lehman Brothers’s U.K. subsidiary (LBIE), it turns
out, had been using the so-called “alternative approach” under U.K. rules
for segregating clients’ funds from the firm’s own funds.278 Pursuant to
that approach, rather than keeping client funds segregated at all times,
the firm could accept client funds into, and pay client funds out of, its
“house” accounts, so long as, at the end of each day, it segregated client
money into a client bank account based on the total amount to which all
clients would be entitled if they withdrew all of their assets.279 The result
of Lehman Brothers’s using that method was the creation of an inherent
274. Wendy L. Gramm & Gerald D. Gay, Leading a Regulatory Agency: Lessons from
the CFTC, Regulation, Fall 1994, at 64, 65 (“As markets change, existing regulations
become obsolete and require elimination or updating.”).
275. That statute is, again, the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64
(2012).
276. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing Investment Company Act’s regulatory approach
and investor protection concerns it produces); see also Krug, Investment Company as
Instrument, supra note 57, at 272–74 (describing how regulation of mutual funds under
Investment Company Act is based on corporate governance norms inconsistent with how
mutual funds actually operate).
277. See Lukas Becker, Protection Racket, Risk, June 2012, at 62, 62 (reporting
“[c]lients and affiliates of Lehman Brothers’ UK-based entity found themselves in [a] trap
when the securities firm went bust . . . [d]ue largely to an unexplained last-minute money
transfer”).
278. See id. at 62–63 (observing “LBIE used what is known as the alternative
approach to segregation, in which client assets are initially paid into a house account
before being transferred into client money accounts at the end of the day”).
279. See Fin. Servs. Auth., Client Assets Sourcebook § 7.4.16 (2013), available at
http://media.fshandbook.info/content/full/CASS/7/4.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing protocol for using “alternative approach” for segregating clients’
funds); cf. Becker, supra note 277, at 64 (“The alternative approach was developed as an
acknowledgement that large, international institutions are too big and complex to
immediately track and process every client money payment, so regulators allowed them to
reconcile the accounts at the end of the day instead.”).
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risk that the firm would somehow use or dissipate client funds before the
required end-of-the-day reconciliation.
One can surely imagine the rest of the story: Such “dissipation” is
exactly what occurred as the firm became insolvent, leaving the pool of
client funds on deposit with LBIE depleted relative to the amounts owed
to clients.280 By all accounts, the effect of the alternative method in the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy came as a surprise not only to clients and
customers but also to the regulators themselves.281 Accordingly, although
Lehman Brothers, consisting of entities scattered over the globe,
operated as a single firm, whether a client’s funds were adequately protected turned on the particular entity that happened to hold them—and
that determinant was, as it happened, rather random.282 U.S. regulation
would have provided greater client protections had it applied,283 but
entity-based regulation meant that those protections were moot once the
assets were transferred to an entity in another country. These unprecedented events not only revealed certain questionable aspects of U.K.
regulation but also demonstrated, for the first time, the ease with which
enterprises may shuffle client and customer assets among entities and,
more importantly, the limitations of U.S. regulation in preventing and
remedying the worst consequences of such occurrences.
We might glean from the Lehman Brothers saga, one of a number
of calamitous events during the financial crisis, that some of the most
troublesome entity-centric laws and rules have simply gone unused,
neither applied to actual facts or extreme circumstances nor, therefore,
280. See Becker, supra note 277, at 63 (“Upon insolvency there was a significant
amount of cash left in the house account—including client money that had not yet been
segregated.”).
281. The questions raised by the U.K. subsidiary’s undersegregation of client funds—
in particular, regarding the whereabouts, designation, and return of client funds—
ultimately required answering by the U.K. Supreme Court. See In re Lehman Bros., [2012]
UKSC 6, [18] (appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/
docs/UKSC_2010_0194_Judgment.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (ruling on
number of questions relating to LBIE’s segregation of client assets).
282. Specifically, some U.S.-based clients who had deposited their funds with
Lehman’s U.S. subsidiary found themselves subject to the troublesome U.K. regulatory
regime, rather than the more protective rules that applied to the U.S. subsidiary, simply
because, in the final days, the U.S. subsidiary transferred client funds to LBIE, apparently
acting without client authorization. See Becker, supra note 277, at 62 (observing shortfall
in client assets was “[d]ue largely to an unexplained last-minute money transfer and a
failure to correctly segregate” those assets); see also Lehman Client Money Issue Resolved
by UK Supreme Court, Practical Law Co. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://us.practicallaw.com/8518-2963?q=&qp=&qo=&qe= (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Many of the LBIE
‘clients’ were US prime brokerage customers, such as hedge funds, and swap
counterparties that entered into transactions with Lehman’s US affiliates, but which had
their posted collateral transferred to LBIE.”).
283. U.S. regulation requires that the assets of brokerage customers and clients be
segregated at all times from the firm’s assets or any other assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3
(2013) (setting forth customer protection requirements relating to brokers’ custody of
customer assets).
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evaluated for their efficacy. Their shortcomings have become apparent
only when, at last, they have been put to the test, in connection with
events that had not previously occurred (and that no one had expected
to occur) or that had features not present in previous episodes of financial tumult.284 And we might, in turn, glean from these observations that
the phenomenon of deploying aging and little-used regulation to new
circumstances is not confined to “tail” events or to the “perfect storm”
circumstances of the crisis years.
Once again, the case studies set forth in Part II are instructive. When
MF Global declared bankruptcy in 2008 and when Allen Stanford’s
financial fraud came to light in 2009, U.S. financial services laws and
rules that had lain mostly dormant or had been insufficiently examined
were put into action. Starting with MF Global, due to the unprecedented
circumstance that customer funds were missing from the firm’s custodial
accounts at the time of the bankruptcy, sleepy CFTC customer-protection
rules became relevant for the first time.285 These rules, premised as they
were on the notion that each regulated entity is separate and independent from all other entities, effectively rendered regulators helpless and
MF Global Inc.’s customers without recourse.286 The problems originated
with the typical approach to regulation: Although MF Global comprised
tens of entities based in far-flung jurisdictions, only a small handful of
those entities were subject to regulation as futures or securities
brokers.287 Therefore, only a small handful of entities were obligated to
adhere to the customer-protection rules—feeble rules, as it turned out,
given the coordinated operations of the MF Global entities.
The Ponzi scheme that Allen Stanford operated through the
Stanford Financial Group companies is also illustrative. As described in
Part II, in connection with the liquidation of Stanford Investment Bank,
Ltd. and Stanford Group Company, the SEC, for the first time ever,
sought to compel SIPC to use its authority under SIPA to provide compensation to Stanford’s victims, who collectively had lost billions to the

284. A primary example in this regard is the effect of institutional interconnectedness among “systemically important” institutions. The financial difficulties or insolvencies
of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers arose, in large part, from the circumstance that
large institutions attempted to shed risk in a manner that would allow an institution’s
failure or near failure to dramatically and adversely affect many other institutions. See
Kevin Buehler, Andrew Freeman & Ron Hulme, The Risk Revolution 10–11 (McKinsey &
Co., McKinsey Working Paper on Risk No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.
mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Risk/Working%20papers/1_
The_Risk_Revolution.ashx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (recounting how “risk
transfer markets” led to failure of various large financial institutions).
285. See supra notes 180–187 and accompanying text (describing rules).
286. See supra notes 180–187 and accompanying text (describing how rules worked
to disadvantage MF Global’s customers).
287. See supra notes 133–138 and accompanying text (summarizing MF Global’s
organizational structure and regulatory status).
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Stanford companies.288 Due in part to SIPA’s having failed to address the
possible (and, indeed, likely) relationship among entities employed in a
common brokerage enterprise, the federal district court evaluating the
SEC’s claim found no statutory basis for the SEC’s request.289 As with the
CFTC’s customer protection rules, lawmakers could have addressed
SIPA’s inadequacy vis-à-vis multi-entity enterprises long ago, but presumably did not because no circumstances had yet arisen that might have
flagged the concerns.
In each of these examples, relevant U.S. statutes and regulations had
to be applied in circumstances that had not theretofore arisen and,
perhaps, had not theretofore been contemplated, and proved themselves
to be too limited in their coverage or, worse, wholly inadequate to
further the purposes for which they were created. Notwithstanding that
the relevant provisions may have served their respective purposes at the
time of their inception, as applied to today’s brokerage firms, they
revealed themselves to be unsuited to do the job. More precisely, they
revealed themselves to be too entity-centric to do the job. That they stood
as the only tools that U.S. regulators and courts had at their disposal to
address investor injury evinces an atrophy of sorts—a subtle, yet significant, loss of strength and ability that has occurred through disuse and
over time, as contexts have changed and as stand-alone entities have
become multi-entity enterprises.
This conception helps explain why entity-centrism in financial
services regulation has not, until now, received significant scholarly
attention. The problems that entity-centrism causes arise in a piecemeal
fashion, as crisis events occur and resolution is pursued. In the efforts to
formulate regulatory changes to prevent an episode’s reoccurrence and
aid the injured, the connections among episodes are not sought, let
alone evaluated. Each catastrophe, much like the fictional entities at the
base of much financial services legislation and rulemaking, is perceived
as isolated and stand-alone. To be sure, the catastrophe is deemed connected to events that might possibly occur in the future and that, therefore, necessitate preventive tools, in a type of vertical connectedness
among similar events occurring at different times. It is not, however, seen
as related to contemporaneous events. This failure to perceive such horizontal relationships—to discern similarities among ostensibly dissimilar
contemporaneous incidents—is a failure of policymaking and regulation.
Again, the issue, as likely as not, is that no one has paid attention. Let us
begin paying attention.

288. See supra notes 211–212 and accompanying text (describing SEC’s role in
seeking SIPC compensation for Stanford’s victims).
289. See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text (summarizing SIPC’s
arguments—with which court agreed—that SIPA coverage was not appropriate in Stanford
context).
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IV. ESCAPING ENTITY-CENTRISM
Beyond exposing the entity-centrism of financial services regulation,
the previous Parts reveal the ways in which entity-centrism prevents regulation from achieving its objective, which primarily is to protect those
who seek and receive investment, brokerage, and other finance-related
services. Financial services regulation must overcome its current entitycentric premises—that is, its implicit assumptions that financial services
providers are stand-alone entities and that entity boundaries are necessarily meaningful for regulatory purposes. An obvious further task, then,
is to think critically about how best to move beyond entity-centrism and
toward more logical and more effective modes of financial services regulation.
The task is formidable. It requires addressing a number of questions,
including what, exactly, is problematic about entity-centrism. As preliminary answers to that question, Parts I and II suggest that, when regulation
centers on entities, viewing them as distinct units, it ignores the ways in
which entities are related to one another and the ways in which their
activities are intertwined.290 It also fails to acknowledge that the discrete
entity, though possessing its own management and ownership structure,
may in fact be controlled by something or someone who controls affiliated entities and deploys them all for a common, overarching purpose.291
Both of these descriptions signal the same phenomenon, namely that
financial services firms are enterprises that, whether for good or bad,
comprise multiple entities working in coordination with one another.
Moreover, sporadic exceptions to regulatory entity-centrism, such as the
doctrines of “control person” liability in securities regulation292 and substantive consolidation in bankruptcy law,293 serve to confirm this conclusion rather than belie it. The problem with entity-centrism is that it is
blind to the regulatory complications that the financial services firm
creates.
That observation, however, is not meant to suggest that all
manifestations of entity-centrism are problematic. As Part III indicates, to
the extent securities regulation, in all its forms, can be viewed as a type of
financial services regulation, the need for an entity focus becomes
apparent.294 Securities regulation originates with the entity and, in

290. See, e.g., supra Parts I.B.2–3, II.A.3–4 (describing, in mutual fund and futures
brokerage contexts, how regulation inappropriately regards entities as isolated units).
291. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.3 (describing how Allen Stanford used multiple entities
to carry out fraudulent activities).
292. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing control person liability).
293. See supra notes 165–172 and accompanying text (summarizing substantive
consolidation doctrine).
294. See supra notes 261–266 and accompanying text (describing relevance of
entities for securities regulation).
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particular, the entity’s activities in raising capital from third parties.295
Regulating what an issuer—an entity—may, must, and cannot do in that
process has entailed specifying the entity’s and its management’s disclosure obligations, permissible personal trading practices, and so forth.296
With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it now also entails dictating the composition of board committees and the standards by which
firm audits must be conducted.297 To be sure, Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements are entwined with the defining facet of entities—their governance
norms and procedures—and, hence, are entity-centric. However, the
goal of those requirements, like the primary objectives of the Securities
Act and much of the Exchange Act, is to rationalize the (intrafirm)
relationship between ownership, on the one hand, and “control,” on the
other.298
Nevertheless, because mutual funds and other registered investment
companies are subject to at least some aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley by
virtue of their status as publicly held companies, the statute has financial
services regulatory implications—and, it would appear, may be hindered
by entity-centrism to that extent. For example, the statute provides
certain protections for “whistleblower” employees of public companies
who report fraudulent conduct or securities laws violations.299 If an
employee of an investment adviser reports fraudulent adviser conduct
that caused losses to the shareholders of mutual funds (which, again, are
public companies) that the adviser manages, the question arises as to
whether the employee would (or should) fall within Sarbanes-Oxley’s
protections. Although the close relationship between mutual funds and
their advisers might suggest an affirmative answer,300 the adviser is
nonetheless a separate entity from the one whose shareholders suffered
losses (and is usually a privately owned firm, at that). It is unclear
295. See supra notes 261–263 and accompanying text (noting securities regulation’s
focus on protecting shareholders).
296. See Hazen, supra note 263, at 2–4 (describing, in broad strokes, regulatory
approaches embodied in Securities Act and Exchange Act).
297. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.) (subjecting public companies to
various requirements designed to increase corporate accountability and financial disclosures and to prevent accounting fraud).
298. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out
of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 519, 534 (1999)
(“The goal [of the federal securities regulatory structure] has been to protect investors by
prohibiting fraudulent and manipulative practices and by requiring disclosure of
information material to investment decisions so as to provide investors and the
marketplace with sufficient information to make informed investment decisions.”).
299. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (providing no publicly traded company “or any . . .
contractor [or] subcontractor . . . of such company . . . may . . . discriminate against an
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of” employee’s engagement
in certain protected activities).
300. See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text (describing relationship
between investment adviser and mutual funds it manages).
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whether Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provision contemplates that
arrangement, although the Supreme Court is poised to decide the
matter.301
These considerations pose another question, however: How are the
circumstances in which entity-centrism “works” to be distinguished from
those in which it does not? This is another way of asking how, from a
purely practical perspective, we should rethink the contours of financial
services regulation. It is a question of which rules, in particular, are in
need of reform and a predicate to the further question of how that
reform should be carried out. Although that query is sufficiently difficult
that further analysis is necessary to address it thoroughly, a few considerations come to mind.
As an initial matter, lawmakers and regulators should be especially
vigilant in discerning an unwarranted elevation of the entity in the regulation of financial services activities that typically are pursued by multientity enterprises, in which affiliations among entities tend to be
manifold and overlapping. The key is to focus on the “movers and
shakers,” as it were—that is, circumstances in which, as to the enterprise
as a whole, there exists a core group of decisionmakers, operating within
the parent company or perhaps as owners of the various entities within
the group. Regulation should center on these decisionmakers, so that
regulatory “form” is dictated by substance—namely, the “who,” “how,”
and “why” behind both financial services activities and the complex
multi-entity business structures in which they are situated. If many
entities are involved in providing a larger corpus of financial services
under the same general name or under common control, then there
emerges the likely prospect that they or units within them are being
operated as a larger, comprehensive business.
A recent episode of CFTC rulemaking highlights the problems this
vigilance could avoid. In particular, in the aftermath of MF Global’s
bankruptcy,302 and with the intent of moderating futures brokers’
counterparty risk (such as the risk that a counterparty will become insolvent), the agency adopted a new rule imposing counterparty concentration limitations.303 Under the rule, a futures broker is prohibited from
entering into reverse repurchase agreements with any single counterparty (yes, an entity) beyond the point at which the securities the broker
301. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will proceed with the case in late
2013. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3648
(U.S. May 20, 2013) (No. 12-3); see Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear
Fidelity Whistleblower Case, Reuters (May 20, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/05/20/us-usa-court-fidelity-idUSBRE94J0F020130520 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Lawson and
summarizing facts of case and issue to be decided).
302. See supra Part II.A.3–4 (describing regulatory failings that became apparent
after bankruptcy).
303. 17 C.F.R. § 1.25(b)(3)(v) (2013).
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purchases from the counterparty under the agreements exceed twentyfive percent of the value of the assets that the broker holds in segregation
for customers.304 Incredibly, in adopting the rule the CFTC evinced no
recognition that any particular counterparty inevitably will be part of a
multi-entity enterprise and that, once the magnitude of a broker’s
reverse repurchase arrangements with one counterparty threatens to
breach the twenty-five percent threshold, the broker and that enterprise
could readily circumvent the rule’s strictures by simply substituting
another entity within the enterprise as the nominal counterparty.
Although the CFTC later took steps to close this loophole,305 it did so
without acknowledging the broader challenges posed by its entity-centric
approach to rulemaking. Without that recognition, however, we should
expect that its—and other agencies’—rulemaking will continue to produce loopholes to be patched or other deficiencies to be remedied later
on, ensuring a regulatory process that is both blinkered and inefficient.
Other signals for policymaking vigilance include circumstances in
which the goals of a particular brand of financial services regulation
cannot be said to be corporate governance goals. In other words, if regulation is not directed at protecting shareholders from management or
otherwise pursued in the name of managerial accountability, then the
rationale for focusing regulation on the entity is necessarily muted. This
characterization of at least some financial services regulation squarely
encompasses the many types of service providers who facilitate transactions in securities, futures contracts, and other investment instruments—
service providers who, in other words, play an intermediating role in the
financial markets. Regardless of whether a firm is a broker-dealer, an
investment adviser, a futures commission merchant, a commodity trading
advisor, a swap dealer,306 or one of any number of other types of
intermediaries operating in the securities and futures markets and
304. See Investment of Customer Funds and Funds Held in an Account for Foreign
Futures and Foreign Options Transactions, 76 Fed. Reg. 78,776, 78,788–89 (Dec. 19, 2011)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 30) (describing rationale for setting concentration limit at
twenty-five percent of value of segregated customer assets).
305. In 2012, the CFTC proposed to close the loophole by amending the rule to
require that an FCM “must aggregate the value of the securities purchased from two or
more different counterparties . . . if the counterparties are under common control or
ownership.” Enhancing Protections Afforded Customers and Customer Funds Held by
Futures Commission Merchants and Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 77 Fed. Reg.
67,866, 67,888 (Nov. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
306. A swap dealer is a person who is in the business of serving as a counterparty to
swap agreements. See Swap Dealer, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/
swap-dealer.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) (defining
“swap dealer”). Swap dealers, like futures commission merchants, commodity trading
advisors, and commodity pool operators, are regulated by the CFTC under the
Commodity Exchange Act. See Registration Information for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, Nat’l Futures Ass’n, http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-registration/sd-andmsp/index.HTML (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013)
(summarizing regulatory requirements applicable to swap dealers).
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beyond, the entity is not a relevant guidepost in formulating regulatory
obligations because that regulation is not directed at adjusting the
balance of power among the core corporate constituencies.307 Its aims,
rather, are to protect consumers of financial services and to ensure the
integrity of the markets.
Finally, lawmakers should have heightened skepticism of entitycentrism in regulation that elevates the importance of an entity that is
used as a mechanism of convenience to group and order those who
would be separately entitled to regulatory protections. This indicator is
present anywhere a group of clients or their assets are regarded as a
single “thing” by virtue of pooling arrangements, and it describes most
investment entities, whether public (such as mutual funds) or private
(such as hedge funds and private equity funds). If an entity is used as a
tool, after all, then its relevance lies not in its role in bringing together
entrepreneurs and investors (whose relationship is the focus of corporate
governance doctrine) but, rather, in its altering the form of processes or
procedures that, in substance, could proceed in the entity’s absence.
Taken together, these indicia suggest that various parties need to be
particularly alert to entity-centrism—and, further, take steps to address
it—in regulatory contexts in which the entity itself has no function or
meaning apart from its role as a facilitator. This is particularly true for
lawmakers and regulators, who are accustomed to thinking of regulatory
subjects in terms of entities, and for providers of financial services, who
are able to realize efficiencies both by pooling (in entities) consumers of
their financial services and by separating (into entities) the assets and
liabilities associated with particular tasks or functions. After all, an entity
can be regarded as a “mechanism” or facilitator only when it can be
viewed from a perspective outside of itself and can be controlled and
manipulated by something beyond itself.
Of course, regulatory approaches that partly mute entity boundaries
have long been staples of particular financial services regulatory
domains, particularly banking regulation, which might suggest that
financial services regulation has already identified and addressed the
concerns that multi-entity firms generate. For example, under the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA),308 the parent companies (“bank
holding companies” or BHCs) of entities that are U.S. banks are subject
to regulation by the Federal Reserve, which provides “consolidated
supervision” of both the parent company and its subsidiaries.309 In addi-

307. See supra notes 249–265 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between
“core” securities regulation and financial services regulation).
308. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852
(2012) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
309. See Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We Call a Bank:
Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 Rev.
Banking & Fin. L. 113, 118 (2011) (observing under BHCA any company owning or
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tion, if an entity within a multi-entity organizational structure becomes
insolvent or undercapitalized, banking regulation requires that other
entities within that structure provide certain types of financial support to
the troubled entity.310
To be sure, banking regulation might seem to preclude a BHC from
pursuing many types of financial services activities. Among other things,
BHCs generally are not permitted to hold large ownership stakes in
businesses that pursue nonfinancial or certain non-banking-related
financial activities,311 thereby distinguishing them from the financial
services activities that are the focus of this Article. However, BHCs that
meet certain capitalization and management requirements and that,
therefore, qualify as “financial holding companies” or “FHCs” may
engage in nonbanking financial activities, such as underwriting and dealing in securities.312 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act applies a version of
the BHCA’s model of regulation to “systemically important financial
institutions” or “SIFIs”—that is, enterprises that are sufficiently large or
connected to other financial enterprises that their insolvency would
threaten the stability of the financial system.313 Perhaps, then, the financial services world has already overcome entity-centrism.
That conclusion would be unwarranted. First, the BHCA’s regulatory
approach is limited because it governs banks and their affiliates and,
therefore, does not address the entity-centrism that pervades the nonbanking regulatory domains this Article discusses. Second, when one
looks more carefully at the requirements to which banks and their affiliates are subject under the BHCA, it becomes apparent that entity-centric
difficulties persist even in the banking context because subsidiaries in
that context, as in other financial services contexts, generally remain
subject to regulation based on the specific functions of discrete
controlling U.S. bank must “register with, and become subject to consolidated regulation
and supervision by, the Federal Reserve”).
310. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: Challenges to
Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 935, 960–
67 (1993) (summarizing cross-guarantee provision of Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and controlling company guarantee
provision of FDIC Improvement Act of 1991); Jackson, supra note 65, at 536–37 (describing FIRREA’s cross-guarantee provision).
311. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (setting forth restrictions on banks’ nonbanking
activities).
312. See id. § 1841(o)(9) (setting forth requirements BHC must meet to be “well
managed”); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(1) (2013) (setting forth requirements BHC must meet to
be “well capitalized”); Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 309, at 119 (describing thresholds
BHC must meet to be deemed so-called financial holding company).
313. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398–402 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323) (setting
forth regulations for certain nonbank financial companies); see also Omarova & Tahyar,
supra note 309, at 127 (observing Dodd-Frank Act “effectively expands the BHCA model
of regulation and supervision . . . to all financial institutions designated as ‘systemically
important’ and thus subject to consolidated supervision by the Federal Reserve”).
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entities.314 That is, regulation of the subsidiaries remains based on entity
boundaries. Third, to the extent that nonbanking financial enterprises,
such as FHCs and SIFIs, are similarly subject to consolidated regulation,
that circumstance does not affect the regulation governing enterprises
that cannot be FHCs (because they are not subject to the BHCA) or that
are not sufficiently large to be deemed SIFIs. Put another way, it does not
affect, let alone remedy, the entity-centrism that characterizes the regulation of the overwhelming majority of financial services enterprises.
Accordingly, despite policymakers’ attempts to overcome entity-centrism
in regulating banking and systemically important enterprises, much work
remains to be done.
All of this does not, however, address what a new mode of regulation
might look like, a challenge that must be reserved for future projects.
There are many avenues, indeed. One conclusion possibly arising from
the case studies presented in Part II, for example, is that regulation
should entail subjecting not only the relevant subsidiaries but also the
parent entity to regulatory requirements. Alternatively, but similarly,
perhaps “regulation” should mean regulation of the enterprise in its
entirety, encompassing not just the parent entity but also other affiliated
entities. The important component of both of these alternative
approaches is that the entities and individuals that stand in a controlling
position vis-à-vis the regulated subsidiaries would fall squarely within
regulation’s ambit, notwithstanding that those parties may not themselves provide financial services.
In the contexts of both MF Global315 and the Stanford Financial
Group,316 such an “enterprise-based” regulatory approach likely would
have forestalled the difficulties that ultimately arose. For example, by
directly subjecting a parent entity, such as MF Global Holdings Ltd., to
the regulatory regime to which the service-providing subsidiaries are
subject, the assets of the subsidiary would, almost by definition (and
certainly by express mandate), encompass the parent entity’s assets.317

314. See Omarova & Tahyar, supra note 309, at 119–20 (“[A]ll functionally regulated
non-bank BHC subsidiaries—including securities broker-dealers, investment advisers,
insurance companies or commodity futures professionals—are regulated and examined by
the applicable primary regulatory agency, such as the [SEC], [CFTC] or state insurance
regulators.”).
315. See supra Part II.A (describing entity-centrism in MF Global context).
316. See supra Part II.B (describing entity-centrism in Stanford Financial Group
context).
317. Such an approach would accord with, but arguably go beyond, certain rules in
the banking regulatory context. Under these rules, in the event of a banking subsidiary’s
insolvency, entities affiliated with the subsidiary must provide certain types of financial
support to the subsidiary. This requirement “modif[ies] the concept of limited liability
and corporate separateness.” Broome, supra note 310, at 938; see Jackson, supra note 65,
at 511 (discussing, in financial holding company context, “legal requirements that holding
companies guarantee . . . the solvency of their regulated subsidiaries,” such as through
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Moreover, if the parent entity were regulated in the same manner as the
service-providing subsidiaries, then “substantive consolidation,” whereby
multiple entities within an enterprise effectively are liquidated as though
they were a single entity,318 would be considerably more workable than at
present because both the parent entity and the subsidiary presumably
would be subject to the same bankruptcy liquidation procedures.
An enterprise-based regulatory approach could also more effectively
further SIPA’s objectives, including in circumstances involving Stanfordlike fraud. Applicable rules might, for example, specify that if any two or
more entities within the group perform functions together that if
performed by a single entity would subject the entity to SIPA’s requirements, then the group as a whole will be subject to SIPA. Accordingly,
the assets of the entire group would be available to compensate victims of
whatever fraud the entities might jointly perpetrate or other losses the
entities might jointly cause. Similarly, if regulation were to apply to the
entire group, then regardless of whether a brokerage subsidiary creates a
fund or other pool through which to provide services, that new entity,
too, will automatically be captured by SIPA.
A move toward an enterprise-based regulatory approach in the
private fund (e.g., hedge fund) and public fund (e.g., mutual fund)
contexts319 would similarly be a move toward viewing the investment
adviser and the funds it manages as an enterprise. In both contexts, after
all, the fund is part of an enterprise, one whose constitutive entities are
connected to one another not through ownership but, instead, through
control in fact: But for the adviser, the entity would not exist, and,
without the adviser, the entity would not continue to exist. Accordingly,
as suggested in Part I,320 a new mode of regulation would acknowledge
that the fund is controlled by something beyond itself—the investment
adviser—and that the fund is really nothing that is not reducible to its
investment adviser (and the adviser’s investment strategy), on the one
hand, and its disparate investors, on the other. In this alternative
approach to regulation, the adviser would have the primary regulatory
duties, and the investors would be the primary beneficiaries of those
duties.
It is also worth considering whether the goals furthered by
enterprise-based regulation could be achieved more efficiently through
more limited measures. For example, rather than subject a parent entity
to regulation, perhaps CFTC rules could simply require that, for discrete
“recapitaliz[ing] insolvent subsidiaries or . . . compensat[ing] government authorities for
losses that failed subsidiaries impose on public claimants . . . or public insurance funds”).
318. See supra notes 165–172 and accompanying text (describing substantive
consolidation doctrine).
319. See supra Part I.B.1–2 (describing difficulties arising from entity-centrism in
these contexts).
320. See supra Part I.B.1–2 (suggesting alternative approaches for regulating
investment advisers and mutual funds).
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purposes, a subsidiary’s proprietary assets are deemed to include those of
the parent entity. Or, perhaps the rules could specify that a parent entity
and its regulated subsidiary may be substantively consolidated upon
bankruptcy, notwithstanding that the entities involved are otherwise
subject to different bankruptcy liquidation rules. Another approach
might be to direct regulation at the various categories of risks the different entities in an enterprise create. For example, if one entity has the
authority to use an affiliated entity’s assets for business or trading
purposes and, therefore, might be said to act jointly with the affiliated
entity in placing the affiliate’s proprietary capital or customer assets at
risk, then both the entity and the affiliated entity could be subject to
targeted regulation aimed at protecting those assets.321
Beyond the regulatory arenas that this Article highlights, future
projects might also involve analyzing the Commodity Exchange Act or
the financial services components of the Exchange Act, such as the laws
and rules governing broker-dealers, to catalogue provisions that assume a
stand-alone entity and to formulate an efficient means of dislodging that
assumption or muting its effects, such as through definitional amendments. Yet another project might extend the analysis of entity-centrism
more directly into the realms of banking or insurance regulation, where,
as in other financial services arenas, multi-entity enterprises dominate.
Still another might evaluate whether entity-centrism is more pronounced
or more harmful in particular regulatory contexts, with the objective of
informing policymaking priorities. Finally, it will be important to study
the relative costs and benefits of less entity-centric regulation, with a view
toward analyzing whether the relative efficiencies of current regulatory
approaches might, in at least some contexts, ultimately justify their shortcomings.
CONCLUSION
Focusing on discrete examples and case studies, this Article brings to
light the problems arising from entity-centric laws and rules. It also shows
that entity-centrism can be observed in other financial services regulatory
contexts and, as a relatively consistent affront to common sense, ties
together circumstances that might otherwise seem unrelated. This is not
to say, however, that entity-centrism appears in all regulatory contexts or
that an overhaul of all laws and rules necessarily is in order. Yet in many
regulatory arenas, entity-centrism is prevalent enough, and its

321. This proposal is reminiscent of the suggestion in the banking context that
regulation should be oriented around risk. See Schooner, supra note 5, at 478–87 (proposing “regulatory model built around risk”). For example, “if the activities of a bank affiliate
could cause a loss to the bank insurance fund, the laws enacted to protect the fund must
reach that activity, or impose the necessary firewalls or other protections to ensure that
those activities do not create that risk.” Id. at 480.
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deficiencies pervasive enough, to warrant a thoughtful, concerted focus
on it.
To “focus” on it suggests at least two things. First there needs to
emerge a recognition of what financial services regulation is—that is,
what its relationship is to the “securities laws” or the “commodities laws.”
The laws and rules governing financial services are subsumed within
broader bodies of laws and rules—broker-dealer regulation is set forth in
the Exchange Act, for example—and they also extend beyond those
other bodies of laws and rules; not all of financial services regulation is
found in the securities statutes, for example. That circumstance means
that it is necessary to reconsider longstanding assumptions about the
homogeneity of laws and rules united by a single subject heading (but
perhaps not much else). The securities laws do two very different jobs.
On the one hand, they specify aspects of the relationship among the constituents in a single entity—namely, owners (investors) and management—and, in particular, specify what protections need to be given to
owners in acquiring that status. In that sense, aspects of the securities
laws are entity-centric, and rightly so. On the other hand, the securities
laws regulate the behavior of those who facilitate investors’ activities in
the securities markets. That is, they regulate securities-related financial
services, and, in that process, the entity is not relevant.
Second, scholars and regulators will need to dedicate their efforts to
formulating new approaches to financial services regulation, keeping in
mind that laws and rules are entity-centric in various ways. Some fail to
recognize that financial services providers use entities as mere mechanisms or instruments in providing their financial services, changing the
way in which the service is delivered but not the service itself. Others fail
to reflect that a “firm” need not be a single entity but instead may consist
of two, three, or hundreds of entities that provide financial services
together, operating as a single unit ultimately controlled by a core group
of decisionmakers. The effort also needs to keep in mind the different
ways in which entity-centrism pervades a range of contexts, such as
investors’ and others’ understanding of the boundaries of the regulatory
subject,322 and courts’ adjudication of claims against an investment
adviser based on the conduct of a mutual fund the adviser manages323 or
claims by an adviser’s employees for whistleblower protection based on
harm the adviser caused the mutual fund’s (rather than the adviser’s)
shareholders.324

322. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (noting investors’ apparent
confusion about organizational structure of firms from which they seek financial services).
323. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (noting courts have adopted
entity-centric approaches to decide cases involving mutual funds).
324. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text (noting entity-centrism
impedes efficacy of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as statute applies to mutual funds).
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Given the complexities of financial services regulation, of course,
constructive new regulatory approaches cannot be advanced in the
abstract. However, it should be clear that overcoming regulation’s entitycentrism does not entail defeating important goals of corporate governance. For example, the project does not, nor should it, have any implications for limited liability principles protecting shareholders. Nor does it
or should it expand or reshape the generally established conditions for
piercing the corporate veil, as that doctrine traditionally has been
understood.325 The important part of rethinking regulation is the
recognition of the forces that cause it to fail. For it is that recognition
that permits moving beyond piecemeal, one-off fixes for crisis events and
newly discovered problems, to more encompassing, and more coherent,
financial services regulatory approaches. In this day and age, with ever
more complex corporate structures, only such approaches will sustain
the work that financial services regulation is supposed to do.

325. See Smith & Williams, supra note 14, at 220–25 (summarizing veil piercing
doctrine).
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